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This thesis discusses the impact of a movement‘s reticulation structures on its ability to 
sustain mobilization in the presence and absence of political opportunities. It initially focuses 
on the relationship between the nature of a movement‘s reticulation structure and the 
movement‘s behavior. It goes on to explore specific connections between varied reticulation 
configurations and specific behaviors they are associated with, based on a detailed 
comparison between the student movement and women‘s movement in Iran from 1997 to 
2008.  
This study shows that a movement‘s reticulation structure will affect its behavior. The 
student movement employs a hybrid composed of cliques and polycephalous structures, 
which gives it the ability to respond quickly to opportunities as they arise. In contrast, the 
women‘s movement employs a hybrid structure that is segmented, decentralized, and 
reticulated. This enables the women‘s movement to utilize an abeyance structure to sustain 
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Soon after the revolution of 1979 in Iran, the Islamic regime took actions against two 
important pillars of Iranian society: women and students. Both had a major role in the 
revolution of 1979. The Family Protection Law was abolished and women were barred from 
holding many governmental and judiciary offices. In addition, women were required to 
observe Islamic dress codes in all public places. In response to these new rules, on March 8th 
1979, the International Women‘s Day, thousands of women protested in Tehran. The next 
target of the revolution was university campuses. Revolutionary vanguards invaded 
university campuses under the name of a ―cultural revolution‖ and the Islamic regime closed 
all universities for three years (1981-84). Although women engaged in ongoing contention to 
regain their rights, the revival of the student movement did not happen until early 1997. 
The presidential campaign of 1997 not only boosted dissent but also opened 
opportunity for reform struggles. Mohammad Khatami‘s landslide victory in 1997 was a 
turning point in Iran‘s political atmosphere. Women and students played a major role in 
Khatami‘s presidential campaign. 
The Closure of Salaam, a daily newspaper, on July 7th, 1999 triggered a student 
uprising in Tehran and fifteen other cities for almost ten days. Salaam was not an ordinary 
paper; it was a Left-Islamic daily, founded by Ayatollah Mousavi-Kho'einiha, a leftist cleric 
and a former member of Majles-e-Khobregan-e-Rahbari (the Assembly of Experts for the 
Leadership). Salaam not only had been targeting and criticizing the key institutional element 
of the Islamic regime, i.e. Velayat-e-Faghih (the Rule of Supreme Jurisprudence), but also 
had been the only speaker for students, women, laborers and others who wanted their voices 
to be heard. A day before its closure, Salaam had published a ―top secret‖ letter about a new 
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tougher press law issued by the ministry of intelligence addressing Majles (the parliament). 
Soon after Salaam shut down, the regime banned more than 200 publications overnight. 
During president Khatami‘s first term (1997-2001), women‘s rights activists and 
student activists ventured a lot but they didn‘t gain much. Even the few laws, passed by the 
reformist parliament (the sixth term), in support of women‘s rights for divorce were vetoed 
by the Guardian Council claiming the laws were in conflict with Islamic law. This resulted in 
much less support and fewer votes for Khatami‘s re-election in 2001. According to Mohsen 
Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard who became a reformist and now 
lives in Washington DC as a political activist in exile, ―unfortunately, the experience gained 
from the reform movement in 1997-2005 proved that no possibility exists of moving the 
democratic movement forward within the framework of the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic and the fundamentalist theoretical structure of these groups‖ (Sazegara 2006, 30)1. 
In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president and he declared a return to 
Ayatollah Khomeini‘s revolutionary values. His taking power was a huge setback for 
democratization in Iran. Women and students were the first victims of his policies. A new 
―cultural revolution‖ started; this time not by closing campuses, but by purging dissenting 
professors and imposing heavy sanctions on student activism. The new government replaced 
many university presidents with clerics who did not have any knowledge of modern 
academics. Establishing Basij units in all campuses to monitor student activism was another 
move towards militarization of the universities. 
In 2005, the Guardian Council banned women‘s candidacy for the presidency. On 
June 12th  2005, in the heyday of the Presidential election and in political gaps between the 
two governments, women‘s rights activists gathered and initiated a campaign demanding an 
                                                          
1 I observed Chicago style of citation throughout the paper.  
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end to institutionalized discriminatory laws against Iranian women. These women, some of 
them students and also active in the student movement, organized a vast campaign which 
aimed to collect one million signatures to demand changes to discriminatory laws against 
women. The ―Change for Equality‖ campaign grew fast and became the main mobilization 
vehicle of the women‘s movement. Since its formation, the campaign activists have been 
faced with oppression from radical groups, and Ahmadinejad‘s government imposed even 
more discriminatory laws against women. 
Both of the events, the students‘ protest on July 7th, 1999 as well as the women‘s 
demonstration on June 12th, 2005, started peacefully. On those days, masses of people poured 
into the streets demanding changes. But the power holders in Tehran heavily repressed them. 
The Islamic Republic is not a democratic regime. In the eyes of the state, protest and 
contention are not legitimate; Basij and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps repress 
movements rather than negotiate. 
The closure of salaam in 1999, and the order of the Guardian Council preventing 
women from presidential candidacy in 2005 created incentives for student and women 
activists to protest against authorities. Transition from a reformist administration to a more 
hard-line government in 2005 brought changes in opportunities and initiated new phases of 
contention for both of the movements in Iran. Neither the student movement nor the 
women‘s movement enjoys a centralized leadership and organization. So, how can the 
movements' participants sustain their contention in the face of state repression and changing 
political opportunities and constraints? 
Political opportunities are: political openness, political realignment, influential allies, 
and factionalization within the polity. Constraint is the state‘s capacity and will to repress 
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(Tarrow 1998).  Some dimensions of opportunity, in the period under study (1997-2008), 
such as the state‘s repressiveness were more stable, and some dimensions such as influential 
allies changed drastically. No matter how stable the structure of political opportunity was, the 
student movement and women‘s movement have exhibited both periods of contention and 
relative quiescence during the period under study. Therefore, the quest of this research is not 
to formalize an explanatory matrix based on the political opportunity structure, but to explain 
a movement‘s ability to sustain mobilization based on the forms of mobilization it employs, 
its repertoire, and the social networks and connective structures on which it builds (Tarrow 
1998). 
This thesis concentrates on social movement organizations in Iran. I am interested in 
two Iranian social movements and their organizational structures: the women‘s movement 
and the student movement. In particular, I examine the relation between the reticulation of 
these movements‘ organizations and their ability to sustain mobilization in the presence and 
absence of political opportunities. According to Merriam-Webster ―to reticulate‖ means ―to 
divide, mark, or construct so as to form a network‖. This paper studies the organizational 
structures of the student movement and women‘s movement in Iran and compares their 
mobilization abilities based on their reticulation. Both of these movements take the form of a 
net in which, ―nodes are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through 
intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages‖ (Gerlach and Hine 
1981, 55). Here I have examined these organizational structures within a decentralized 
framework. A decentralized organization is segmentary, polycentric, and reticulated. 
The existing literature on the relation between decentralized social movement 
organization and social movement behaviors explores the effectiveness of a decentralized 
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approach in turbulent social, cultural, or political climates; addresses the role of personal ties 
in a movement‘s formation; discusses the role of social ties and bonds in recruitment 
processes; and evaluates the role of web based communications on mobilization. But it does 
not address specific connections between varied reticulation configurations and specific 
behaviors they are associated with; how various configurations of many segments that are 
horizontally linked and exchange information through grapevine communication structure 
affect a movement‘s behaviors. In addition, the existing literature is mostly based on the 
studies conducted on democratic systems, and in the cases of nondemocracies, the main 
focus has been the effectiveness of non-violent tactics rather than the nature of a movement‘s 
reticulation structure. This study tries to shed some light on variations of a movement‘s 
behaviors based on the movement‘s reticulation nature within a nondemocratic regime in an 
under developed country in the Middle East. 
This study will show that the nature of a movement‘s reticulation will affect its 
behavior. More specifically, in my study of the two Iranian movements I have found that the 
women‘s movement is more decentralized and more segmented with its abeyance structure, 
and therefore has a better ability to sustain mobilization and that the student movement, 
which has a more centralized structure in a limited environment (campuses), and mostly in 
contact with a specific faction of the society (students), can respond faster when 
opportunities are available, or conditions to create opportunities exist.   
In the next chapter I discuss two theoretical approaches to examine the mobilization 
ability of the movements in this study: the political process and decentralized organization 
approaches. I define decentralized organizational structure and reticulation, review the 
existing literature, and assess the role of social network in studying social movements. 
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Chapter 3 provides the research methodology and then introduces the hypothesis that is 
tested. I also discuss what I hope to contribute and the gaps I have found in the literature. 
Chapter 4 discusses the power structure of the Islamic Republic, its legitimacy issues and its 
impact on the rise of social movements in Iran. In chapter 5, and 6 I discuss the student 
movement centered on the OCU and women‘s movement centered on the Change for 
Equality Campaign, their main mass protests, and their mobilization vehicles respectively. 
Both of the chapters consist of an examination of challenges to the theocratic regime in 
Tehran. Chapter 7 examines the hypothesis with respect to the reticulation of the movements' 
structures and their mobilization abilities. Both movements implemented a decentralized 
organization and in both cases the Islamic state was faced with a loss of legitimacy, 
especially after the failure of the reformist administration and its parliament. Finally, the 
concluding chapter assesses the role of reticulation in sustain mobilization in the presence 




















2. Historical Context 
In the following sections, my goal is to explain the power structure of the Islamic Republic 
and discuss its non-democratic political system. Secondly, I will narrate briefly the student 
movement and the women‘s movement from 1997 to 2008. I will describe their mobilization 
vehicles, their main events (i.e. protest or demonstration), and their main challenges under 
the reformist administration of President Khatami (1997 - 2005), and while the conservative 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, held the office (2005 - 2008). I am leaving the 
organizational structures and outcomes of the student movement and women‘s movement to 
chapter five (From Organization to Mobilization), where I will discuss the impact of their 
reticulation structures on their mobilization abilities in the presence and absence of political 
opportunities. 
 
The power Structure of the Islamic Republic 
Since the revolution of 1979, Iran‘s political system has been an Islamic Republic. Although 
the term ‗republic‘ might bear a resemblance to a democratic state, at the same time the term 
‗Islamic‘ heralds a theocratic state. This duality within Iran‘s political system has been 
reflected in the way that power has been exercised in the state (Thaler, et al. 2010). Ali 
Banuazizi (1995) argues that Islamic Republic‘s contrasting image is rooted in the 
inconsistency and conflict between its bureaucratic system operating within a constitutional 
framework and a cleric who is appointed rather than elected and rules above all civil laws. 
 According to Asghar Schirazi (2008) there are two main sources of contradiction in 
the Islamic Republic‘s constitution: Disagreement between Sharia (Islamic law) and civil 
laws; and disagreement between democratic and non-democratic components. 
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 The constitution of the Islamic Republic is based on the following Islamic 
components: the state has an Islamic Shi‘a nature; the mission and responsibilities of the 
Islamic Republic are defined based on Sharia; the leader of the state has to be a Shi‘a Faghih 
cleric (a cleric who has the authority to interpret Islamic laws based on Quran and other 
Islamic sources); legislations of any sort have to be in consistent with Sharia; Islamic laws 
mark the boundaries and criteria of civil rights citizens practice; political and civil 
institutions are responsible to preserve Islamic characteristics of the state. According to the 
democratic components of the constitution, citizens can contribute to national affairs through 
electoral participations, elect their representatives for Majles (the Parliament), Urban and 
Rural Councils, and enjoy some democratic rights such as freedom of speech; freedom of 
press; freedom of political parties, unions, and associations; freedom of assembly; and 
censorship, and intercepting citizens‘ phone calls, letters, and other communication means 
are forbidden (Schirazi 2008, 16-24). Schirazi argues that religious components and civil 
constituents negate each other: ―Authoritative power of Shi‘a clerics is in conflict with 
authoritative power of citizens through elections; there is discrepancy between Islamic 
Ummah (the Muslim community) and Iranian nation; the Supreme Leader rules over the 
president; The Guardian Council disarms the Majles, and Velayat-e Faghih (the rule of 
jurisprudence) contradicts the republic‖ (2008, 25). 
 According to the constitution, Iranian people toppled the monarchy through an 
Islamic revolution, and the sovereignty devolved on the people. At the same time, the 
constitution asserts the sovereignty just belongs to God and the hidden Imam (the twelfth 
Shi‘a Imam), which in his absence God entrusts the sovereignty to Valy-e Faghih, who holds 
the institution of Velayat-e Faghih. In addition, the Iranian people, based on the Islamic 
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Republic Constitution, are not equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the 
sovereignty, rather only the members of the Shi‘a Twelver Muslim community are entitled to 
all the rights. But in practice, even a Shi‘a Twelver Muslim is subject to more restrictions if 
he wants access to the power structure (i.e. representative of Majles). Such a candidate 
should prove his loyalty to the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic Constitution, and 
Velayat-e Motlaghe-ye Faghih (the absolute rule of the jurisprudence). Muslim women are 
not equal under the law and they enjoy half of the rights men do. Women are barred from 
holding many offices including becoming judges. Generally, women, ethnic minorities, and 
religious minorities (more than 50% of the population) are treated as second class citizens in 
front of the law. 
After the revolution, Khomeini ordered the execution of Army Officers of the old 
regime. Soon after, the Revolutionary Courts sentenced opponents and anti-revolutionaries to 
either long term in prison or execution. The regime became more and more politically 
repressive: no political parties, no dissent, no access to political participation for opponents, 
compulsory Islamic dress code for women, abolition of the majority of rights women had 
gained before the revolution, oppression of youth, and damaging the middle class (Banuazizi 
1995). Reza Afshari (1996) examined the Islamic Republic‘s human rights record with 
respect to the Universal Human Rights Declaration and rated Iran‘s performance as a 
disaster. According to Afshari human rights in the Islamic Republic are in crisis due to the 
following: citizens are not equally protected against the law - there is no social system of 
justice; political dissidents have no access to political participation and the regime portrays 
them as enemies of God; very limited freedom of press and cultural affairs under 
governmental watch and censorship; no tolerance for apostasy; no personal freedom; faked 
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trials with no attorney, and confessions under torture; mass political executions; 
institutionalized discrimination of women‘s rights in all aspects of life (R. Afshari 1996). 
According to Bashiryieh there is a big difference between the Islamic Republic 
Constitution and the old regime‘s Constitution - the one which was based on the 1906 
Constitutional Revolution. Legitimacy in the old Constitution was rooted in the nation, and 
parliament was in the center of power, whereas the new Constitution seeks its legitimacy in 
God and Majles does not have its old place in the power structure. After the revolution there 
was a rift among the clergy over the matter of leadership. Although some favored the Islamic 
tradition of Shoura (consultation), Khomeini and his followers successfully institutionalized 
religious and political authority in the concept of Velayat-e Faghih (Thaler, et al. 2010, 
Bashiriyeh 1984). 
 Schirazi (2008) discusses the rift between clerics over the institution of Velayat-e 
Faghih is rooted in the different interpretations of Sharia components of the constitution. 
Those who favor Velayat-e Faghih believe the Islamic constituents affirm the absolute rule 
of the jurisprudence, whereas the opponents‘ interpretation of the same constituents is a 
conditional rule of the jurisprudence. 
After the death of Khomeini the ruling clergy divided over appointment of his 
successor. They knew there was nobody who could fill Khomeini‘s position. Apart from his 
charisma, he was not only religiously qualified but also a political leader (Banuazizi 1995, 
Bashiryieh 1984, Sadjadpour 2008). Before Khomeini‘s death, parliamentarians drafted an 
amendment to the Constitution stating that religious qualification and political leadership 
were two separate matters. Thus, the Assembly of Experts appointed then President 
Khamenei as the leader. Soon after, Khamenei was elevated to a leader with religious 
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qualifications necessary to seize the institution of Velayat-e Faghih.  This move led to 
widespread factionalism among high-ranking clerics. Any criticism was responded to 
brutally. Even when the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who had originally introduced 
Velayat-e Faghih, criticized Khamenei, the regime took him under house arrest till his death. 
According to a recent report by RAND (2010), in the past 25 years the power in Iran 
has been in the hands of a small number of ruling individuals who remained loyal to the 
institution of Velayat-e Faghih. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of power in the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic. The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who controls the 
institution of Velayat-e Faghih, is central to the power structure. Individuals who find their 
ways to the political institutions are either appointees or candidates approved by the Supreme 
Leader. Even the president, who is the most important authority after the Supreme Leader 
according to the constitution, has a relative influence and power in policy decision making. If 
the president has Khamenei‘s support he can pursue his agenda (i.e. Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad), otherwise he fails (i.e. Mohammad Khatami). ―Khatami‘s failure as the 
president to open civil society and to pursue relations with the West was a clear example of 
Khamenei‘s power to prevent Iranian domestic and foreign policy from changing in ways 
that contradicted his own worldview‖ (Thaler, et al. 2010). 
According to Karim Sadjadpour (2008), considering the unexpected appointment of 
Khamenei as the Supreme Leader after the death of Khomeini helps in understanding his way 
of leadership. Although Khamenei has lost face, due to his strong networks with different 
institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards, Guardian Council, Majles, and judiciary, he 
has remained the foremost powerful man. 
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Iranian society has been divided into two main networks: khodi, meaning ―one of us‖ 
(beneficiary of the regime), and gheyr-e khodi, ―outsider‖. The Supreme Leader and his 
associates (15% of the population), who are appointed or approved by him within the power 
structure are khodi, and the rest of the population (75%) consists of middle class, students, 
women and pro-democracy forces are gheyr-e khodi (Thaler, et al. 2010).  
Figure 1–The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic in its Constitution2 
 
 
                                                          
2 Source: Adapted from Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, "Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's 
Political System," The Muslim World, vol. 94, October 2004, p. 506, cited in RAND 2010, p. 23 
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According to Mehrdad Mashayekhi (2007), political structures in nondemocracies impact 
social movements‘ formation in these countries. He recognizes the Islamic Republic as a 
nondemocratic regime because of the following reasons: there is no separation between 
religious and political institutions; the state employs a specific interpretation of the Shi‘a 
Islam as an ideological tool to control the society; the regime has different paramilitary 
forces with parallel intelligence communities for intimidation; and institutionalized 
discriminations against women, modernists, seculars, dissents, and ethnic and religious 
minorities. Mashayekhi argues that within the last three decades the discriminatory policies 
of the theocratic regime of Tehran have marginalized various segments of the society and 
have barred them from political, economic, cultural and social participations. He concludes 
that grievances are main sources of social mobilization in post-revolutionary Iran. 
Participants in different social movements in Iran, when a relative political openness is 
available, have challenged the state through a varied set of collective actions: signing 
petitions, peaceful protests, sit-ins, demonstrations, chanting, and blogging. 
 Mashayekhi (2007) argues the Islamic regime has maintained a powerful presence in 
various facets of the society and has monopolized both economic and political structures. 
This omnipotent existence has turned many social movement participants from cultural 
challengers into political opponents. Susan Tahmaasebi, one of the participants of the One 
Million Signatures Campaign, mentions that ―the rights Iranian women want to achieve is a 
socio-cultural issue, we are not opponents of the regime, but the authorities, to prove the 
righteousness of their ideology, treat us as political opponents‖ (One Million Signatures 




There are different accounts that show Iranian authorities seeking democratic 
legitimacy through electoral process (Ganji 2005, Mashayekhi 2007). ―Democratically 
disguised dictatorships use semi-democratic elections to choose government officials with 
very limited power, all of whom are approved by the regime‖ (Ganji 2005, 43). Political 
opposition parties and pro-democracy forces who struggle for reform or a regime change in 
Iran have been divided over the matter of electoral participation. One group boycotts 
elections as long as the Islamic Republic is in control. Reformists believe that electoral 
participation is important even they know there would be a slight chance for their candidates 
to be elected.  The third group argues that democratic forces should look at electoral 
participation based on the socio-political context of the day. If they are able to reshape the 
political structure in their favor (i.e. Presidential election of 1997, and 2009) they should 
participate in the election. If their participation does not have any impact on the political 
process (i.e. 2005) they should boycott the election. Mehrdad Mashayekhi (2007) argues that 
after the failure of the reform movement, the center of struggle for democracy shifted to the 
society. Resistance and struggles of social forces, including political challenges of the student 
movement, numerous women‘s campaigns, unions and labor movement, and ethnic 
resistance are all signs of future widespread movements across Iran. He mentions that, in this 
critical time, it is the responsibility of oppositional elites to raise the political awareness 
among the participants of these movements and to orchestrate their future mobilization. 
It seems oppositional elites and liberal forces could successfully grab the attention of 
international community toward social movements and their struggle for democracy. Karim 
Sadjadpour, a scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recognizes 
individuals, groups, and trends, in post-Khomeini era, that have been able to grab 
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international attention. Table 1 demonstrates domination of social movements in the center of 
focus since 1997. 
The institution of Velayat-e Faghih generally and the Supreme Leader specifically 
have been the target of the student movement and the Green Movement (the movement that 
formed in protest to the disputed results of the 2009 Presidential election). The women‘s 
movement has challenged the Islamic law and sought the equality of men and women in front 
of the law. The inability of the Islamic regime to address national issues and the failure of the 
reform process have both been sources for mobilization. 
Table 1 – Various individuals, groups, and trends determining Iran‘s trajectories since Khomeini‘s death3 
Year /Focus The Individual  The Group The Theme 
1989-1997 President Rafsanjani Islamic technocrats Post Iran-Iraq war 
reconstruction 
1997-2005 Reformist President 
Khatami 
The student movement Democracy and civil 
society 









2009-present Symbolic leaders The Green Movement Liberalism 
 
Akbar Ganji (2005) and Mohsen Sazegara (2006) explain that with the failure of the 
reform movement (Khatami‘s government), it seems the Islamic regime is not able to solve 
its own problems and there is a need for a Constitutional change followed by a regime 
change. They agree that the reform movement cannot lead to a democratic state. 
Participants in the student movement and women‘s movement in Iran could be faced 
with the charge of Moharebeh (the enemy of God). But despite the state‘s violent repression 
                                                          
3 Source: Adapted from Karim Sadjadpour, ―Reading Khamenei: the World View of Iran’s Most Powerful 





accompanied with a shadow of fear, people do not comply, they rather defy. Women 
participate in all social activities in spite of institutionalized discriminations and students 
continue to be the voice of society. In the following two sections I briefly discuss the student 
movement and women‘s movement within a historical framework from 1997 to 2008. I will 
explain these two movements in more details in chapter five, where I discuss their 
organizational structures and their unique impact on the movements‘ behaviors in the 















The Student Movement: 1997-2008 
Introduction 
According to one account, soon after, the establishment of the University of Tehran in 1934 
student activism was born.  But the root of the student movement in Iran goes back to 
December 7th, 1953, when students of the University of Tehran started protesting against 
Mohammad Reza Shah‘s White Revolution. Since then, this movement has taken different 
trajectories, and has shown up in different situations, either against universities‘ 
administrations, or against authorities, before and after the revolution of 1979. Students have 
mainly leaned toward the left of the Iranian political spectrum, but there has also been pro-
government student activism sponsored by the Islamic regime in recent years. However, the 
revival of the student movement did not happen until early 1997. The presidential campaign 
of Mohammad Khatami, initiated by students and supported through university campuses, 
not only boosted dissenting activism, but also provided an opportunity for reform struggles. 
Women and students were key components of Khatami‘s presidential campaign. Khatami‘s 
landslide victory in 1997 was a turning point in Iran‘s political atmosphere. According to 
Mashayekhi (2001) the student uprising in Tehran and fifteen other cities, which lasted for a 
week, focused national and international attentions on the student movement in Iran. What 
triggered the massive mobilization across Iran was the brutal and bloody invasion of 
government security forces and paramilitary members of Ansar-e Hezbollah (followers of the 





The July ’99 Protests 
According to Ali-Akbar Mahdi (1999) there have been many uprisings and protests in the 
Islamic Republic; most of them were rooted in the mishandling of economic policies. But the 
mass mobilization of July 1999 had a political rather than an economic nature. He argues ―it 
represented the strongest manifestation of the structural crisis unsettling the Islamic Republic 
of Iran‖ (Mahdi 1999, 17). Mashayekhi (2001) explains how a series of events provided 
necessary conditions that led to the July protests. 
Many refer to the closure of Salaam, a daily newspaper, as what triggered the student 
uprising of 1999 (Baghi 2005, Mahdi 1999, Mashayekhi 2001). Salaam was not an ordinary 
paper; it was a Left-Islamic daily, founded by Ayatollah Mousavi-Kho'einiha, a leftist cleric 
and a former member of Majles-e-Khobregan-e-Rahbari (the Assembly of Experts for the 
Leadership).  Mahdi (1999) argues that a couple of months before the July events some 
radical newspapers affiliated with the conservative faction of the authority warned that 
student activities conducted by the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OCU) were against the 
institution of Velayat-e Faghih (the Supreme Rule of Jurisprudence) and Sharia (Islamic 
law). They warned that if the administration did not stop dissent, the revolutionary vanguards 
and devotees to the path of Imam Khomeini would take action. Members of Majles, on July 
7th, 1999 passed a bill stating some new measures for press (more censorship). A few days 
before this move, Salaam disclosed the story and published the letter from an intelligence 
officer addressing Majles on the necessity of limiting the freedom of press even more. This 
gave the excuse to the authority to ban this newspaper. According to Mousavi-Kho'einiha 
(1999) the main reasons that Salaam was ordered closed were: 1- Criticizing the institution of 
Velayat-e Faghih; the regime‘s economic policies; the Guardian Council‘s Nezaarat-e 
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Esteswaabi (Approbatory Supervision); and national affairs, 2- Disclosing the serial killing 
of intellectuals and political opponents, 3- Defending the rule of law (based on the 
Constitution), 4- Defending civil liberties (based on the Constitution), 5- Reasonable defense 
of Islam and the Revolution, 6- Pioneering Khatami‘s presidential campaign, 7- Being the 
official speaker for the students. Baghi (2005) argues that the regime knew if ordered to close 
Salaam, there would be vast consequences and it would probably be faced with national 
protests. Therefore, this order was not issued by a middle or even a higher level official, but 
by the Supreme Leader, who was the center of all the criticism. 
The same night, July 7th, 1999 students of the University of Tehran peacefully 
protested in front of their dormitories and requested the regime to reverse its decision and let 
Salaam continue publishing. But the authorities attacked the students and repressed them 
brutally. Nearly 1000 rooms were destroyed, a few hundreds injured, some students were 
killed, and over a thousand students were arrested, some of whom are still in prison 
(Mashayekhi 2001). The regime issued three execution orders for the leaders of students 
(Mahdi 1999). ―During the following days, thousands of students, employing various 
methods of protest including rallies, demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and even violent street 
skirmishes, openly challenged the system, particularly its authoritarian conservative faction‖ 
(Mashayekhi 2001, 284).  
The student movement not only gained national and international recognition, but 
also showed that people of Iran are different from the rulers of the Islamic Republic. A few 
days after repressing the students, the Islamic regime of Tehran, faced with a legitimacy 
crisis, arranged a pro-government rally at the University of Tehran in support of the Supreme 
Leader and the institution of Velayat-e Faghih (Mashayekhi 2001). 
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Students, Universities, and Mobilization 
Alvin Gouldner (1985) describes students as carriers of ―the culture of critical discourse, a 
subculture of reason and critical judgment which facilitates the critique of the power 
structure and conventional wisdom‖ (Mashayekhi 2001, 286). Jungyun Gill and James 
DeFronzo referring to Phillip Altbach (1989), characterize students as ―a conscience of their 
societies‖ (Gill and DeFronzo 2009, 207). Altbach (1981) recognizes various reasons for 
student activism in underdeveloped and undeveloped countries: 1- suffering from the lack of 
democratic structure and in the absence of political parties and institutions, access to political 
participation, especially for dissent activism, is very hard or impossible; 2- students are 
generally from middle and upper middle class families and universities are in capitals, 
centers of power, or other major cities. Another source for student activism, almost in every 
country, is the campus-related issues like the condition of dorms, the quality of foods, 
transportation, tuition rates, student/teacher ratio, and etc (Mashayekhi 2001).  
 According to Mashayekhi (2001), to study the nature and source of the student 
movement in Iran, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind spreading university 
campuses after the revolution of 1979. The rapid expansion of campuses across Iran is due to 
the following factors: the increase in urban population, the fact that universities are not 
centered in major cities anymore, the proliferation of private and Azad universities, Iranians‘ 
growing interest in higher education, and a better living standard in rural areas (Mashayekhi 
2001, Ziba Kalaam 2001). In addition, there are two more important issues that have 
contributed to the student movement in Iran: The first is, ―the governmental quota system‖. 
Children of families who were victims of the Iraq-Iran war could attend universities through 
a quota channel. Many of these students are not in harmony with the dominant student body 
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(as studious as those who enter universities through the entrance examination), and this has 
damaged the quality of education (Mashayekhi 2001). The second is, ―cultural revolution‖. 
Mahdi (1999) mentions that in 1980, a year after the Islamic regime consolidated its power, 
the authorities issued an order that there would be no tolerance for political activism across 
the campuses, and the activities and behaviors of the students must meet Islamic terms. A 
month later, and before the Persian New Year 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini blamed universities 
as the sanctuaries for the anti-revolutionary and infidel professors and students under 
influence of Western intelligence communities. Shortly after his speech revolutionary 
vanguards led by the Islamic Student Associations (ISA) raided colleges and higher 
education centers which resulted in closing all universities for three years. The Islamization 
process and gender segregation policies have intensified student activism during all these 
years (Mashayekhi 2001, Ziba Kalaam 2001). 
 Considering the struggle of Iranians for freedom and the rule of law since the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1906, students have been legitimate political actors (since 1934) 
and universities have been ―alternative institutions‖, as Mashayekhi (2001) points out, in the 
absence of political parties and institutions. Universities that participated most in the history 
of the student movement are either in capital Tehran or other major cities, where power or 
religious centers are located. Mashayekhi argues that universities contribute to mobilization 
by supplying resources to the movement participants. The various resources are: 
―organizations, funds, information, framing process, media connections and location, 
classrooms, libraries, dining halls, plazas, and a set of informal social networks including 
artistic groups, sports associations, travel groups, and student-run libraries provide arenas for 
political mobilizations‖ (Mashayekhi 2001, 290). He compares periods with some level of 
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political openness and periods with a higher degree of repression. In the former, formal 
organizations are active, whereas in the latter, dissent activism is disguised in informal 
networks. 
 
Office for Consolidation of Unity 
To understand the organizational role of Daftar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat (the Office for 
Consolidation of Unity) within the student movement in post-revolutionary Iran, it is 
necessary to look at its complex trajectories within the last three decades (Table 2). A radical 
Islamic organization, once established by the authorities to monitor student activism 
throughout campuses, has been turned into an independent liberal student organization 
criticizing the most important pillar of the Islamic Republic, i.e. Velayat-e Faghih. 
A few months before 1980, the representatives of Islamic Associations of Students 
(ISA) held a national meeting and announced the establishment of the Union of the Islamic 
Association of Students of the Universities and Other Higher Education Centers. Pouya, a 
student activist, explained to me, in their meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini, [the 
representatives of ISAs concerned with differences between Islamic students], he told them 
―Beravid Tahkeem-e Vahdat Konid‖ (i.e. go and consolidate your unity). After this meeting, 
the ISAs called their union, Daftar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat (the Office for Consolidation of 
Unity). From 1980 to 1989, the OCU was an arm for the establishment and student activism 
was in its lowest degree. During the history of the OCU in post-Khomeini era, whenever the 
regime was concerned about challenges from the OCU, they employed the British policy of 
―divide and rule‖. After the death of Khomeini, the balance of power shifted from the 
political left to the political right, and the OCU lost its influence within the newly arranged 
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establishment and started criticizing. The ruling clerics (Rafsanjani, the Head of Majles, and 
Khamenei, then President) who, were concerned about the political participatory role of the 
OCU, and were aware of their lower degree of credibility among the OCU members tried to 
influence within this organization. 
The new power structure tried to limit the OCU by limiting the activities of some of 
the ISAs, even announcing them illegal and arresting their activists. This intervention turned 
the OCU from absolute supporter to a critic, but still in support of the regime. Over the next 
four years the following factions were recognizable within the OCU: Jaryan-e Velayat Pazir, 
or Velayee (followers of the new Supreme Leader); Left-leaning trend affiliated with 
Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez and Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Enghelab; and the new Modern Fraction 
who were in absolute minority. 
The Modern Fraction had a new and different interpretation of the OCU role. They 
adopted the doctrine of Abdolkarim Soroush and other religious intellectuals, who ―were 
engaged in a highly emotional theoretical debate criticizing a traditionalist reading of 
jurisprudence (fegh-he sonnati) on liberal and scientific grounds‖ (Mashayekhi 2001, 293). 
This group wanted the OCU to be an elected body of the students, rather than the appointees 
of the establishment, and also wanted it to become autonomous. According to Pouya, who 
was one of the founding members of the Modern Fraction, this group was able to consolidate 
the electoral process into the OCU.  
Some of the excluded Left-leaning members of the OCU joined the leftist press and 
organizations, such as Salaam, or Kian, think tanks of religious intellectuals leading by Dr. 
Abdolkarim Soroush (Mahdi 1999, Mashayekhi 2001). The exclusion of the left political 
faction from power provided an opportunity for the leftist intellectuals to criticize their past 
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which resulted in spreading a pro-democracy approach and a new interpretation of Islamic 
values among this group (Mahdi 1999, Mashayekhi 2001). 
Through their close ties with religious intellectuals and moderate Leftist elites, 
democratic values diffused into the OCU and this organization became more autonomous. 
Consequently, political pressures started to mount against the OCU members (Mashayekhi 
2001). Mashayekhi argues that members of the OCU started to embrace promoting 
democratic values throughout the campuses, where the disruption and violent repression of 
their gatherings and activities became the regime‘s systematic routine. Frustrated with the 
continued threat and repression from the conservative faction of the establishment and 
backed by Leftist elites, the OCU decided to vastly participate in the upcoming presidential 
















Table 2 – The trajectories of the Office for Consolidation of Unity from 1980 – 2008 
Year Key Authority Key Events Political Orientation 
09/27/1979 Khomeini The OCU established Revolutionary\Leftist 




1983-1989 Khomeini The OCU Participated in 
the parliamentary and 
presidential elections of 
1983 and 1987, 
The OCU mobilized 
students to the battle 
field in Iran-Iraq war 
 
Revolutionary\Leftist 
1989-1996 Khamenei\Rafsanjani The OCU criticized  
economic and foreign 
policies 









1998 Khamenei\Khatami The OCU protested 
against the presence of 




1999 Khamenei\Khatami Challenging the 
institution of Velayat-e 
Faghih, and the 
Guardian Council‘s 




07/08/1999 Khamenei\Khatami Mass mobilization Modern Fraction 
(dominated) 
1999-2001 Khamenei\Khatami Election campaigns for 
the Urban and Rural 
Councils, the Sixth 
Majles, and the re-






2001-2005 Khamenei\Khatami Failure of Reformists, 
the election campaign for 
the Seventh Majles, the 
ninth Presidential 
election, the regime 
created a fake OCU 
parallel with the OCU 
Modern Fraction 
(Allameh trend) 
2005-2008 Khamenei\Ahmadinejad The OCU protested 








The Seventh Presidential Election 
The presidential election of 1997 was a turning point in the activities of the student 
movement. The regime, faced with the legitimacy crisis, decided to give some freedom 
during the presidential campaign and debates. There were 234 presidential candidates, 
including nine women. The Guardian Council approved just four male candidates; three 
conservative candidates and the fourth, reformist Khatami (Mashayekhi 2001). The OCU 
was leading in organizing Khatami‘s campaign on campuses. Ali Afshari4 was the 
coordinator of Khatami‘s presidential campaign in more than 30 universities across Iran. 
Mashayekhi (2001) argues that apart from their roles as voters and activists, students were ―a 
new reference group‖ for the public. In a society suffering from the lack of dissent political 
activism and continued propaganda through state-controlled media that enforced ruling 
clerics as a reference group for people‘s decision, the OCU marked students as a new, 
trustworthy group of reference.  Under the reform administration student activism prospered: 
1- the new administration revoked some of the restrictions on campuses; 2- peaceful 
demonstrations were allowed if permitted; 3- more than 100 protests took place within the 
first two years of Khatami‘s administration; 4- the protests and demonstrations either were 
condemning the closure of secular publications, torturing political prisoners, serial murdering 
of dissent intellectuals, or were in support of human rights values; 5- great impact on public 
opinion; 6- great motivation for mass mobilization of the younger generation, especially for 
the electoral campaign of the Sixth Majles also known as the reformist Majles; 7- criticism of 
the performance and legitimate position of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei (Mashayekhi 
2001). By the end of 2004, the OCU established itself as the mobilization vehicle and 
                                                          
4 Ali Afshari was a board member of the Islamic Student Association of Amir Kabir University (1995-1999) 
and in central leadership of the OCU (1999-2004). 
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adopted a leading role for the newly revived student movement. ―The OCU is in a strategic 
position to connect the Islamic Associations in most academic institutes‖ (Mashayekhi 2001, 
308). 
 
The Failure of the Reform Administration 
After the July events of 1999, President Khatami remained silent for three days. This was a 
big backlash for the student movement. The students requested an open trial for the security 
forces and authorities behind the scenario of the bloody attacks on the dormitories of the 
University of Tehran. But it seemed Khatami‘s administration was not able to follow the 
students‘ requests in this matter. This resulted in a much lower turnout for Khatami‘s re-
election in 2001. In addition, the Guardian Council, backed by the conservative faction in the 
Majles, rejected or stopped many reform bills the reformists prepared. In 2004, during the 
electoral campaign for the Seventh Majles, the Guardian Council rejected many of the 
reformist candidates due to financial scandals. Many of the oppositional elites boycotted the 
Majles election. Mehrdad Khansari argues that ―the experience of the past 7 years since the 
advent of President Khatami, have demonstrated that while ordinary citizens may go through 
the motions of turning up at regularly held elections, this makes very little impression on how 
the country is run. This is mainly due to the fact that standing above the election process are 
those unelected officials, headed by the Supreme Leader, who assume the right to bypass 
people.‖ The OCU also, after assessing the political structure of the upcoming election as an 
opportunity, boycotted the election. According to Abdollah Momeni, then board member of 
the OCU, President Khatami and his reform administrations betrayed people‘s votes; they 
had many opportunities in hand to reform but easily lost them (Khansari 2003). Sazegara 
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explores the roots of failure of the reformist administration and concludes that the only 
option left is a regime change: ―Democracy, human rights, civil society, and good 
international relations were the goals of the reformists. However, it became quickly apparent 
that reaching those goals within the framework of the present constitution was impossible‖ 
(Sazegara 2006, iv). Akbar Atri, who was a board member of the OCU from 1997 to 2005, in 
his testimony in front of the US Congress explained that the student movement does not have 
any more faith in the process of reform within the Islamic Republic constitution and its 
political institutions. He argued that the reform movement deviated from its main goals: 
democracy, human rights, limiting the power of the Supreme Leader, and structural change in 
the constitution (Iran-e Emrooz 2006).  
The failure of the reformist administration resulted in a rift within the OCU. The 
liberal members of the OCU have become more critical of their past, and have stopped 
unconditional support for the reformists, and have encouraged or discouraged electoral 
participation based on its socio-political context. Whereas the conservative members have 
maintained ―the reformists‘ motto of legalism [that is, remaining within the legal boundaries 
of the current system]‖ (Ganji 2005, 42), and have encouraged unconditional participation in 
elections. Since 2001, the conservatives backed with the Revolutionary Guards and Basij 
forces tried to dismantle the OCU. In 2002, Islamic Student Associations University of 
Shiraz, University of Rasht, and University of Shahroud, held a general meeting in Shiraz 
and announced their own central committee. The regime sponsored this move and created a 
parallel organization, the OCU (Shiraz trend) to fulfill its ambitions for having a controlling 
hand within the universities, and provided them with all sorts of financial and governmental 
support. The OCU (Shiraz trend) is in the minority but due to the regime‘s supports, seized 
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the official website of the OCU and tried to damage the popularity of the OCU (Allameh 
trend), which is in the majority and has much greater support amongst students and pro-
democracy forces. In response to the division, previous members of the OCU led by Ali 
Akbar Mousavi Khoeini (reformist member of the Sixth Majles), sympathized with the 
Allameh trend members, established Sazman-e Danesh Amokhtegan-e Iran (Iran Students 
Alumni Organization) or Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat. This organization is a political 
organization whose main agenda is to defend human rights. Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat has 
its own branch in major university-based cities and has been a great partner for the OCU 
(Allameh trend). Since the website of the Allameh trend has filtered, the website of Advar-e 
Tahkeem-e Vahdat, which runs out of Iran, has been the official site reflecting the news and 
events about the OCU (Allameh) members and their activities. In 2004, the conservative 
faction took over the Seventh Majles and began preparation to consolidate the entire power 
structure in the upcoming presidential election.  
  
The Return of the Conservatism 
In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president and he declared a return to revolutionary 
values. His taking power was a huge setback for democratization in Iran. Women and 
students were the first victims of his policies. A new ―cultural revolution‖ started; this time 
not by closing campuses, but by purging dissenting professors and imposing heavy sanctions 
on student activism. Dr. Ramesht, who was appointed to the University of Isfahan as the 
president in 2005, in a meeting explained how conservatives, after six years of covert 
operations, could take over the government. He mentioned of 40 purges of dissent faculty 
members of the University of Isfahan that was supposed to take place soon (Advar News 
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2005). The new government replaced many university presidents with clerics who did not 
have any knowledge of modern academics. Establishing Basij units in all campuses to 
monitor student activism was another move towards militarization of the universities. Despite 
all of the security measures and repressions, the OCU (Allameh), held the election and its 
new board members started their term in 2005. Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, a reformist 
member of the Sixth Majles, who has been in the United States, issued a congratulation 
statement and praised the bravery of the OCU in its continued activities even under turbulent 
political atmosphere (Advar News 2005). The organization of Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat 
also expressed its happiness about the new board members of the OCU and embraced their 
struggles (Advar News 2005). The hard line administration employed different tactics to 
eliminate the OCU (Allameh trend): creating parallel student organizations and expelling 
dissenting professors and student activists from the universities. The regime, through a 
systematic and engineered method, has planned to bury the bodies of martyrs within the 
campuses to have its vanguards present anytime they want (Momeni 2008). Abdollah 
Momeni (2008) argues that the presence of security forces and Revolutionary Guards 
throughout the colleges is an important sign for the regime‘s legitimacy crisis.  
One of the bravest moves of the OCU, in this period, was the announcement of its 
newly founded committee to defend women‘s rights. The Committee for Defense of 
Women‘s Rights formed on November 23rd 2005. In their statements they declared ―we [the 
OCU] believe the path to democracy shall pass through the women‘s movement‖ (Advar 
News 2005). Bahareh Hedayat, a board member of the OCU and also a member of the 
Change for Equality Campaign, along with three other members of the OCU have been under 
persecution to announce the dissolution of this organization (Jaras 01/28/2010). 
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The Women‘s Movement: 1997-2008 
Introduction 
Iranian women have been key players in numerous historical and contemporary events. Their 
participatory and supporting roles in that past 100 years, for instance, range from supporting 
and being involved in the Constitutional Revolution of Iran to active involvement of support 
during the Iran-Iraq war, helping with the reconstruction process, including helping in many 
different areas of education, cultural, army, and aviation.  
 The emergence of the women‘s rights movement in Iran dated back as early as 1910. 
The women‘s movement was led by the middle to upper class women from Tehran and other 
major cities. The main goals of the movement were education for girls, equality in the 
society, and raising awareness among women of different sects about their rights.  
 Iranian women could achieve many of their goals including modern schools for girls 
in the early twentieth century, published many women‘s journals, established many women‘s 
associations, received the right to vote (1963), were elected as parliamentarians (1963), were 
elected as senators (1964), could receive appointments to the judiciary (1969), cabinet 
position as minister (1968), minister of state for women‘s affairs (1975), head of diplomatic 
missions (1976), and the Queen‘s right to regency (1967). The Family Protection Law 
(1967), the Family Planning Program (1967), and abortion law (1977) helped to develop 
some equal rights for women.  
 Soon after the revolution of 1979 in Iran, the Islamic regime took actions against 
women who had a major role in the revolution. The Family Protection Law was abolished 
and women were barred from holding many governmental and judiciary offices. In addition, 
women were required to observe Islamic dress codes in all public places. In response to these 
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new rules, on March 8th 1979, the International Women‘s Day, thousands of women 
protested in Tehran. The next target of the revolution was university campuses.  Since then, 
women started their struggle to regain the rights they had achieved in the past. This study 
explores the challenges and efforts of the women‘s movement in Iran, centered on the 
Change for Equality Campaign. As Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani mentions, ―the literary and 
intellectual legacy of these earlier activists is one of our campaign‘s most treasured 
resources‖ (Khorasani 2009, 31). 
 
June 12, 2006 
June 12, 2005 was a turning point in the history of the women‘s movement in Iran. On that 
day, thousands of men and women peacefully protested in front of the University of Tehran, 
against the institutionalized discrimination of women‘s rights in the Islamic Republic. 
Women marked that day as the National Day of Solidarity for Iranian Women (One Million 
Signatures Campaign 2008). 
A year later, on June 12th, 2006, women organized a peaceful demonstration to show 
their protest against the discriminatory laws in the constitution. They gathered in Haft-e Tir 
Square, a main square in central Tehran. According to Parvin Ardalan (One Million Signatures 
Campaign 2008), following Shirin Ebadi‘s winning the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, some women 
activists gathered to exchange their ideas on methods to change the discriminatory laws 
against women in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. They called this group Ham 
Andishi (like-mindedness). Susan Tahmaasebi, a campaigner, said in an interview that ―it 
was in this gathering that for the first time I felt I was entering into a place filled with 
feminine self conscious‖  (One Million Signatures Campaign 2008, 30). When asked ―who 
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was behind the One Million Signatures Campaign?‖ in an interview with the Voice of 
America, Persian News Network, Fariba Mohajer, one of the key members of the Campaign 
said ―our feminine dreams‖ (Mohajer 2010). This group invited women from different 
factions of the society, from modernist to traditionalist, and Islamist to secular, to make a 
coalition against ‗Discrimination of Women‘s Rights in the Constitution‘. The following 
groups, organizations, and websites signed this invitation: 90 groups active in women‘s rights 
issues, youth, and environmental issues; 350 women activists; 130 weblogs; and 10 women‘s 
organizations outside of Iran. After its public announcement, the following supported this 
move: many of Nobel Laureates; Human Rights activists; some of the feminist groups and 
human rights activists outside of Iran; Human Rights Watch; 60 members of the student 
organization of the Office for Consolidation of Unity; 114 student activists; 14 student 
publications; 150 male activists; along with 6000 people who silently protested in front of the 
University of Tehran, from 5:00-6:00 PM on June 12th, 2006.  
The security forces attacked the demonstrators and heavily cracked down on their 
peaceful protest. Many of participants were beaten and assaulted. The regime arrested more 
than 70 of activists. 
Since then, the members of the campaign and their supporters defied the regime and 
became more and more resilient. If there is opportunity, they gather publicly, and in the 
absence of opportunity, as Shahla Entesari (2008) explains, they follow their traditional 
gathering, doreh (a women‘s private party); a legacy from the struggle of their ancestors 





One Million Signatures Campaign 
Due to the discriminatory laws against women in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, 
women are treated as second-class citizens in their very land, Iran. Women enjoy half of the 
rights that men have in the nation‘s legal system. The Change for Equality Campaign or The 
One Million Signatures Campaign, supported by a wide range of ideas, made a call to reform 
the discriminatory laws against women, especially family laws, where violation is disguised 
without regard to nation or location. Khorasani (2009) explains that many of her Iranian 
sisters live under the shadow of fear of losing a child, being abused, harassed, or even killed, 
or finding themselves in a crowded marriage style of polygamy. Therefore, if legislatures 
reform some of the laws with respect to custody of child, polygamy, and domestic violence, a 
new horizon would rise to the life of countless women. There are many sermons from ruling 
clerics and Imams in mosques condemning violence against women, but as Khorasani 
emphasizes ―what is needed to protect women is not preaching, but laws‖ (Khorasani 2009, 
15).  
 Janet Chafetz and Anthony Dworkin (1986) define women‘s movement as: 
―conscious and collective revolt on behalf of women, defined as a general category with a set 
of problems and needs specific to themselves, which in turn are created by a socio-cultural 
system that categorically disadvantaged them relative to men‖ (p. 48). Women of Iran, due to 
unjust laws of a theocratic system, institutionally have been disadvantaged and discriminated 
relative to men. But here the problem is worse, the Islamic regime of Tehran considers 
women‘s struggle against Sharia (Islamic law) which is not only the source for the 
constitution, legal system, and judiciary, but also rules above all. Therefore, women‘s 
activists are faced with charges like Moharebeh (enemy of God).  
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 Jo Freeman (1975, 1979) compares centralized and decentralized structures in the 
case of women‘s movement organizations. She argues that while the latter are more effective 
for raising awareness, the former serve best for institutionalization process (Staggenborg 
1989). As it is discussed in the next chapter, the Change for Equality Campaign is a 
decentralized organization that tries to raise awareness and mobilize people to reform the 
current laws. As it has been best described by Noushin Ahmadi Khorasani, one of the 
founders of the campaign: ―It is nowhere and everywhere, placeless yet ubiquitous‖. Table 35 
illustrates the trajectories of the One Million Signatures Campaign from June 2006 through 
2008. 
 Janet Afary (2009) in Sexual Politics in Modern Iran describes the formation of One 
Million Signatures Campaign initiated by educated women believed ―that social activism 
could change things‖. Like their Moroccan counterparts, Iranian women assembled their 
repertoire based on ―Middle Eastern practices of gathering petitions, the consciousness-
raising techniques of American feminists in the 1970s, and contemporary methods of access 
to the Internet and electronic news letters‖ (Afary 2009, 370). 
 Ahmadi Khorasani discusses that the force behind the Change for Equality Campaign 
is very different from secular and Islamic feminists. This generation neither ignores Islam nor 
tries to fit within the religious codes, it seeks a new engineered interpretation of Islam for 




                                                          
5 Adopted from: Ahmadi Khorasani, Noushin. 2009. ―Iran’s Women One Million Signatures Campaign for 
Equality : The Inside Story‖, Women‘s Learning Partnership Translation Series, pp. 155-167 
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Table 3 – Trajectories of the One Million Signatures Campaign from 2006 through 2008 
Year Campaign Activity The Regime’s Response 
June 12, 2006 Peaceful demonstration in support of 
equal rights for women  
Brutal crackdown, 70 men and women were 
arrested 
August 27, 2006 Official Launch of the campaign  
September 15, 2006 Launch of campaign in city of Tabriz  
October 20, 2006 Launch of campaign in city of Isfahan  
November 4, 2006 Launch of campaign in city of 
Hamedan, 
Women‘s rights awareness workshop 
in Hamedan 
 
November 5, 2006 Launch of campaign in Gorgan, 
grassroots workshop in Gorgan 
 
November 9, 2006 Launch of campaign in city of Zanjan  
November 14, 2006 Launch of campaign in Karaj, 
Seminar with 60 activists 
 
December 2, 2006 Launch of campaign in Yazd  
December 14, 2006 First general meeting in Tehran  
December 15, 2006  Arrest and imprisonment of some campaign 
members 
December 29, 2006 Launch of campaign in Kermanshah, 
Training workshop in the same city 
 
January 10, 2007  Some campaign members were arrested in 
Tehran‘s subway while collecting signatures 
January 27, 2007  Some campaign members were barred from 
leaving Iran 
February 22, 2007 Launch of campaign in Mashhad, 
Training workshop in the same city 
 
February 24, 2007 First meeting of the Mothers‘ 
committee in Tehran 
 
February 29, 2007 Launch of campaign in Rasht, 
Training workshop in the same city 
 
March 4, 2007 Peaceful gathering protesting the 
prosecution of 4 women  for their 
participation in the June 12, 2006 
33 women‘s rights activists were arrested 
March 4, 2007 Seminar in support of campaign, 
Soleymaniyeh, Iraq  
 
March 5, 2007  Some campaign members were barred from 
leaving Iran 
March 6, 2007 Launch of campaign in Sanandaj  
March 8, 2007 International Women‘s Day At least 8 women were arrested 
March 14, 2007 Second general meeting in Tehran  
March 15, 2007  Some of the NGOs, and training center active 
in women‘s rights issues were ordered shut 
down 
April 2, 2007  Five campaign members were arrested while 
collecting signature in Laleh Park, Tehran 
April 11, 2007  Some campaign members were sentenced to 
prison 
April 18, 2007  Some campaign members were sentenced to 
prison 
April 26, 2007 Third general meeting in Tehran  




Year Campaign Activity The Regime’s Response 
June 12, 2007 First anniversary of the National Day 
of Solidarity for Iranian Women 
 
July 9, 2007  Student leader and campaign member 
Bahareh Hedayat was arrested 
July 11, 2007  The first male campaigner was arrested while 
collecting signatures 
August 13, 2007  Revolutionary Guard warned against women 
activists and campaigners 
August 25, 2007 Campaign seminars held in 
Kermanshah for activists from 
Tehran, Rasht, and Hamedan  
 
September 3, 2007 Women activists met to mobilize 
against a proposed ―Family Protection 
Bill‖ 
 
September 14, 2007 Training workshop in Khorramabad 25 activists were beaten and arrested 
October 9, 2007  Arrest of women‘s activists in Kurdish 
regions  
October 13, 2007 Launch of website of Men for 
Equality 
 
October 23, 2007 Launch of campaign in Zahedan  
October 30, 2007 Peaceful protest at Allameh 
Tabataba‘i University 
Some activists were arrested 
November 4, 2007  Some campaigners were arrested 
November 15, 2007 Launch of website by campaign 




 Heavy crackdowns on campaign bloggers 
and journalists 
January 23, 2008 First training workshop on women‘s 
rights for campaign members 
 
February 1, 2008 Campaign website established by 
German activists 
 
February 1, 2008  The women‘s magazine Zanan was ordered 
shut down 
February 14, 2008  Some campaigners were arrested 
March 3, 2008  Some campaigners were barred from leaving 
Iran 
March 7, 2008  Some campaigners were barred from leaving 
Iran 
April 8, 2008  Some of the Campaign Mothers‘ Committee 
members were arrested 
April 16, 2008 Launch of campaign activists in 
Cyprus 
 
April 22, 2008 Launch of campaign activists in 
Kuwait 
 
May 4, 2008 Launch of campaign in city of Ilam  
May 8, 2008 Launch of campaign in city of Amol  
May 15, 2008 Two-day meeting for campaign 
members in city of Rasht 
 
June 12, 2008 The second anniversary of the 
National Day of Solidarity for Iranian 
Women 
Nine activists were arrested prior to the event 
June 13, 2008  Some campaign member were arrested 
July 9, 2008  Some campaign member were arrested 
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Year Campaign Activity The Regime’s Response 
July 12, 2008  Some campaign members were appeared 
before the Revolutionary Court 
August 31, 2008 A meeting held by a Coalition of 
women‘s rights activists  
The government backed down on the 
controversial ―Family Protection Bill‖ 
September 19, 2008 The first Human Rights International 
Prize for the campaign, Merano, Italy  
 
October 1, 2008  Iranian-American campaign member Esha 
Momeni was barred from leaving Iran 
October 5, 2008  Some campaign members were arrested  
October 22, 2008  Authorities raided to the houses of some 
campaigners 
October 26, 2008  Some campaigners were barred from leaving 
Iran 
October 16, 2008 Launch of campaign in city of 
Kerman 
 
November 4, 2008 Launch of campaign weblog for 
working group on equal inheritance 
 
November 13, 2008 An achievement for the women‘s 
movement: Majles passed legislation 
equalizing blood-money amounts for 
men and women involved in car 
accidents 
 
November 28, 2008 Reporters Without Borders Jury Prize 
for the campaign 
 
December 6, 2008 Nomination for OneWorld People of 
2008 Award 
 
December 8, 2008  The website was blocked for the 18th time 
 
Women and the Reform Process 
The Presidential campaign of Khatami not only boosted student activism, but also 
encouraged Iranians with diverse backgrounds, from journalists to stay-at-home moms, 
secular or religious, to turn the socio-political discourse from a ‗no-mercy‘ society marked by 
numerous ‗red lines‘ imposed by the state, to a more tolerant discourse. Janet Afary (2009) 
discusses the idea that reform process was mainly shaped by the following factors: many 
Iranians who either participated in the revolution and were involved in the state‘s political 
affairs, or were veterans of the Iran-Iraq war, felt betrayed by the regime‘s policies; the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw allies; and impacts of the communication 
technology, especially internet and satellite channels. For many of the Islamist reformists, the 
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revolution was far beyond anti-imperialism and the fall of monarchy, they were seeking a 
society based on a new interpretation of Islamic texts appropriate for a modern state (Afary 
2009, Moghissi 2009). Hayedeh Moghissi (2009) even goes further and argues that secular 
forces, like Marxist groups or the Iran National Front, who participated in the revolution 
interpreted Khomeini‘s anti-modernist thoughts as anti-Western or anti-Shah, and either were 
ignorant or turned their eyes away from the revolution‘s anti-woman policies.     
 Women had a great level of participation in Khatami‘s Presidential campaign. In his 
speeches, he promised a more tolerant society with less restrictive measures regarding youth 
and women. In her study, Afary (2009) explores the successful participation of women as 
candidates under Khatami‘s administration. She compares the elections of the Urban and 
Rural Councils in 1999 and 2003. Her findings show that the number of female candidates 
doubled within four years, from 7,000 in 1999 to more than 14,000 in 2003.  
Khatami appointed many women as deputies in his administration. These women 
introduced some rules and after lobbying, the Sixth Majles, also known as the Reformist 
Majles, passed a few of them. The Center for Women‘s Participation, an organization 
affiliated to the Office of the President, was the main ally of the women‘s movement within 
the polity (Afary, 2009). Although, Khatami was supportive, on many occasions, of the 
women‘s rights issues discussed in the Majles, the Supreme Leader and his Guardian Council 
either rejected or revised them. One of the main struggles between the reformists and 
conservatives, with respect to women‘s rights issues, was over the adoption of the UN 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
Although Khatami and his fellow reformists supported CEDAW adoption, radical clerics and 
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their followers looked at it as an obvious sign of declaring a war against Islam and God 
(Afary 2009).  
The Guardian Council disqualified many reformist candidates, which barred them 
from the electoral process of the Seventh Majles. This led to a victory for the hard-liner 
candidates. In 2004, the conservatives in the Majles reversed many bills passed by their 
reformist rivals. The weak approach of Khatami‘s cabinet and some exogenous events, such 
as wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulted in the victory of hard-liners throughout the political 
structure. 
 
The Women’s Movement and the Rise of New Radicalism 
In 2005, Ahmadinejad took power as the president. He marked a new radicalism: a return to 
the revolutionary values, plus granting political power to the Revolutionary Guards. 
According to Afary, who was in Iran just before the presidential election of 2005, 
―Ahmadinejad‘s election also expressed a backlash against the sexual revolution taking place 
in Iran‖ (Afary 2009, 331).  
 Afary (2009) explores that gender issues and sexuality will remain challenges of a 
modern Iran for years to come. She argues many of the pro-democracy forces, secular or 
Muslim, from human rights activists to religious intellectuals, who challenged the Islamic 
regime drastically on many fronts, when it comes to the equal rights between men and 
women, they are either ignorant, or hesitate to step forward.  
 Khorasani on how the Change for Equality Campaign formed explains that ―this 
inspiration-seeking on the level of the imagination came to the fore precisely when Iranian 
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women seemed to be facing a dead end in their struggle for justice‖ (2009, 43) after the 
failure of the reformist Khatami. 
 On March 8th, 2007, the regime did not give permission to women to celebrate the 
International Women‘s Day. They were barred from any assembly in public places, thus they 
decided to celebrate it at their homes. Despite the presence of security forces and police, 150 
women activists gathered in one house and held their celebration. Nahid Keshavarz, one of 
the activists, in an interview said ―each of us is a movement by herself, who has been able to 
impose the ‗equality‘ to our patriarchal society‖ (Rahmani 2007).  
 To discredit the efforts of the activists of the One Million Signatures Campaign, 
Ahmadinejad‘s administration introduced a new ―Family Protection Law‖ to the Majles that 
campaigners believe carries more burdens for women than protection in a male dominated 
society. The campaigners in coalition with some eminent Iranian women could stop the bill 
temporarily (Afary 2009, Moghissi 2009).  
 Afary mentions that the theocratic regime of Tehran, aware of the power of the 
women‘s movement, employed different methods to stop and destroy this campaign. But 
despite arrests, jails, death threats, and daily discriminations, the campaign is ―moving on‖ 
although ―slowly but defiantly, challenging a history of oppression and inequality, and 
seeking to change the position of Iranian women, one mind and one signature at a time‖ 
(Afary 2009, 373). 
 While an abeyance structure of these dissenting organizations is necessary most of the 
time because of persecutions, there are strategic tactics made to draw public attention at 
critical times, or when there is relative openness to dissention, such as during elections. For 
example, in 2008, when the nation preparing for the 2009 presidential election, a coalition 
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was formed of more than 40 women‘s groups and 700 activists, called the ―convergence‖ of 
the women‘s movement. The main goal of this coalition was to use the relative openness of 
the elections as a forum for communicating their agenda and distributing literature about the 
women‘s movement. Women activists do not see the elections as a reform itself, or support 


































3. Theoretical Background and Prior Research 
In the following sections, I discuss two theoretical approaches to examine the mobilization 
ability of the movements in this study: the political process and decentralized organization 
approaches. I will define a decentralized organizational structure and review the existing 
literature. Part of the discussion will focus on the different components of a decentralized 
organization. I will focus on reticulation structure and social networking in more detail. This 
chapter will conclude with a summary of different findings with respect to movements‘ 
organizational structures, gaps in the literature, and propose my hypothesis.  
 
Why Examine a Decentralized Structure  
and These Two Movements? 
―Decentralization‖? What a strange structure for a phenomenon that seems to be highly 
orchestrated and harmonized both in structure and in organization. Do social movements 
need to be centrally organized? Or are they just a random grassroots outbreak suffering from 
lack of coordination and leadership. Although the type and scope of a movement‘s 
organization depends on its socio-political context and the authorities‘ response to its rival, 
there has been a consensus over a third type of organizational structure which is neither ―an 
amorphous collectively nor a highly centralized autocracy‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 78). It is 
decentralized! Why decentralization is important for a movement‘s organization is what I 
will discuss in the proceeding sections in more detail. Decentralized organizations are more 
adaptive to changes in their contexts, have a learning mechanism, can survive violent 
oppression, and are innovative. In addition, they are even more effective in non-democratic 
systems where any centralized opposition is the regime‘s target to destroy. 
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A decentralized organization is characterized by segmentation, polycentrism, and 
reticulation (SPR organization hereafter). According to Sidney Tarrow (1998) the most 
successful organizations are the ones ―with a delicate balance between formal organization 
and autonomy - one that can only be bridged by strong, informal, and nonhierarchical 
connective structures‖ (p. 137).  Therefore, the web-like connective structure or the 
reticulation system of a movement is the key player ―operating within and between formal 
movement organizations‖ (p. 137). 
Iran‘s political system is theocratic, a religious dictatorship, in any case not a 
democracy. The regime of Tehran has a robust and centralized government under its supreme 
leader. It is equipped with different military and paramilitary factions in addition to a 
national army and parallel intelligence communities webbed across the nation and among the 
Iranian diaspora. There is no tolerance for any disagreement or criticism, no institutional 
access for opposition, no freedom of press, and no freedom for opposing political parties. 
There are vast human rights violations. In the absence of political freedom, social movements 
in general and the student and women‘s movements in particular are the political voices of 
dissent. Access to political opportunities under the Islamic regime of Tehran is a very 
difficult challenge for opposition movements. In Iran, political opportunities have either 
emerged through endogenous realignment within the polity, as with the Presidential election 
of 1997, and the birth of a reform faction within the system, or, as Alexis de Tocqueville 
mentioned ―when a bad government seeks to mend its way‖ (Tarrow 1998, 74), like free 
presidential debates prior to the Presidential Election of 2009 which led to a disputed result 




Given the high levels of institutionalized discrimination, human rights violation, 
injustice, and oppression in Iran, ―the potential always exists that the hegemonic ideology 
will be questioned and that the state may lose legitimacy through frame transformation‖ 
(Schock 2005, 28). Hossein Bashiryieh, an Iranian political science scholar and a victim of 
Ahmadinejad‘s ―cultural purge,‖ who lives in New York and teaches at Syracuse University, 
argues that the Islamic Republic established its legitimacy based on four main pillars: Islamic 
justice, political religion, anti-imperialism, and anti-monarchy. According to Bashiryieh, the 
Islamic regime of Tehran has been starting to lose its legitimacy. He believes the Green 
movement in the post-presidential election of 2009, the student movement and the women‘s 
movement, expedited this collapse (Bashiriyeh 2009). 
In March 2006 Nameh6 conducted an interview with Abed Tavancheh (board member 
of Islamic Student Association, Amir Kabir University) and Morteza Eslahchi (general 
secretary of Islamic Student Association, Allameh Tabatabaei University) both of them then 
board members of the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OCU, hereafter). They mentioned: 
 ―Until the time that there is no freedom of expressions and political freedom 
it is the duty of us in Islamic Student Associations of Universities to reflect 
issues people are facing in the society. In the absence of civil institutions, 
Student Associations leading by the Office for Consolidation of Unity are 
responsible to play the role of those institutions. This is our responsibility, 
according to the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, to reflect issues 
                                                          
6 Nameh was a political-cultural monthly banned from publication under Ahmadinejad‘s government and its 




and defend individuals under discrimination independent of their religion, 
ethnicity, and ideology‖ (Esmaili 2006). 
As it will be discussed later Tarrow‘s dilemma - the ―delicate balance‖ - is best fulfilled 
through a decentralized structure. Both of the movements under study enjoy a decentralized 
structure. The delicacy of their balance will be examined in this research. 
 
Defining a Social Movement 
Leading scholars in the field offer different definitions of ‗social movement‘. Mario Diani, in 
his comparative study on the concept of ‗social movement‘, recognizes a partial among 
varieties of ‗social movement‘ definitions. Social movements, according to Diani, are defined 
as ―networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or 
organizations, engaged in political and cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective 
identities‖ (Diani 1992, 1). Although there is no consensus over a standard definition for the 
whole phenomenon of ‗social movement‘, many scholars refer to Sidney Tarrow‘s definition 
as the most complete one. He defines social movements as ―collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and 
authorities‖ (Tarrow 1998, 4), rather than seeing them as ―expressions of extremism, 
violence, and deprivation‖ (Ibid, 4). Some scholars see social movements as efforts to 
mobilize people who are ―alienated‖ (Kornhauser 1959, 212) or ―excluded‖ (McAdam 1982, 
25) from the current system, ―who do not believe in the legitimacy of the established order‖, 
and are ready to either destroy the regime or to promote/resist changes in the society 
(Kornhauser 1959, 212, McAdam, 1982, 25). There is another approach that defines ‗social 
movement‘ as a cluster of social movement organizations (SMOs) that are autonomous units 
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with shared beliefs cooperating with each other towards the desired political change (Lofland 
1996, 143, Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 18). 
 
Political Process Approach and SMOs 
Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing process are key elements of the 
political process model (Schock 2005). Although each provides different perspective on 
SMOs, together they offer a complex and comprehensive image of SMO structures and 
practices. Studies conducted by social movement scholars within each of these frameworks 
not only explore the role of organizations in mobilization, but also examine SMO abilities in 
areas such as strategic leadership, sustainability of a movement, and resource acquisition 
(Caniglia and Carmin 2005). 
 Kurt Schock (2005) in his wonderful study about non-violent movements in 
nondemocracies defines political process as an approach that examines ―the structures 
through which people and resources are mobilized, their representations of the social world, 
and the political context in which movements occur‖ (p. 27). He argues that, although the 
political process model initially originated to explain collective action in Western style 
democracies, it has been integrated into the research body to examine the roots of social 
movements in undeveloped and under developed countries as well (Schock 2005). His 
comparison of the three components of the political process model within democratic and 
nondemocratic states illustrates the greater importance of a ―free space‖ in nondemocracies. 
The Political process model concentrates on factors that lead to movements‘ success 
and failure (Caniglia and Carmin 2005). ―The emphasis tends to be on longer cycles of 
mobilization and decline as well as on factors external to movements that can constrain and 
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shape movement outcomes‖ (Caniglia and Carmin 2005, 204). Scholars in the political 
process tradition study SMOs in their socio-political environments and seek out 
organizations‘ reactions to external conditions. These scholars tend not to examine the 
internal operation of formal organizations. The foundation of their theory is based on a 
variety of informal, grassroots settings as mobilization structures (McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1996). The political process model argues that the presence and absence of political 
opportunities play a crucial role that can turn ―the potential for mobilization into action‖ 
(Tarrow 1998). According to Sidney Tarrow there are two sets of aspects one has to consider 
while studying political opportunities. The first set is dimensions that cause changes in 
opportunities: partial access for new participants to institutionalized political system; shifts in 
political alignment; rifts among elites; access to influential allies within the polity (Tarrow 
1998). The second set is constraints that limit opportunities: the strength of the regime and 
state‘s level of centralization; state‘s mode of response to contention; social control and 
modes of repression (Tarrow 1998). 
Activists‘ perceptions of political opportunities and the existence of opportunities are 
separate matters. McAdam (1994) contends that distinguishing between the two ―will allow 
us to understand interesting cases where political opportunities do not lead to collective 
action, and those where collective action arises in the absence of favorable opportunities‖ 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2004). 
Eitan Alimi (2007) based on his analysis of the first Palestinian Intifada argues that 
state repression for demobilization has a reverse effect under some conditions, and can lead 
to even the spread of contention and more mobilization. He explains how a shared perception 
of opportunities (i.e. rift within Israeli authorities over the continued occupation) and threats 
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(i.e. existential threat) outbalanced the latter in the light of the former and resulted in an 
increased contention.  
In her comparative study of the gay and lesbian movement within two time 
frameworks, Mary Bernstein (2003) argues that activists do not act based on a favorable 
political opportunity, rather they respond to opportunities based on their priorities. Therefore, 
political and cultural opportunities, and mobilization are not in a direct relationship and a 
one-to-one map. She explores how the gay and lesbian activists did not mobilize around the 
sodomy law even when the political opportunity was in their favor, and how they chose to 
mobilize behind the sodomy law in a period of closed opportunity and unfavorable 
environment.  
Some scholars have shown interest in sustainability of contentions in the absence of 
political opportunities. Paul Bagguley (2002), and Merrindahl Andrew and Sarah Maddison 
(2010) in their studies of the women‘s movements in Britain and Australia have arrived at 
this idea that some movements faced with closed opportunities spread into free spaces (i.e. 
societal arena) and sustain their contentions, albeit through more invisible ways than protest 
and demonstrations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Paul Bagguley (2002) in his research on contemporary British feminism argues that 
the women‘s movement in UK is in an abeyance phase. It seems the movement is passive, 
but women activists are unobtrusively mobilized; they have meshed into male-dominated 
societal spaces and continued lobbying for feminism. M. F. Katzenstein (1990) defines 
unobtrusive mobilization ―as organized resistance at the level between everyday resistance 
and public insurgency. 
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Merrindahl Andrew and Sarah Maddison (2010) have studied the women‘s movement 
in Australia from 1996 to 2007, when Prime Minister Howard and his conservative 
administration held the office. They explored the reasons why the Australian women‘s 
movement was able to extend its mobilization through an abeyance structure during periods 
of closed political opportunities, but activists are not able to remain in abeyance in a long 
run. These scholars have found that ―the significance of abeyance lies in its linkages between 
one upsurge in activism and another‖ (181). 
The above cases have been conducted in Western democracies. What about 
nondemocracies, where a lower level of tolerance for dissent activities is available? Since 
opposition groups in dictatorships do not enjoy the availability of opportunities and freedom 
in democracies, any sign of political opportunities can lead to contention (Schock 2005). The 
level of tolerance for dissent activities in some nondemocracies is zero, so opposition is 
assumed a threat to the state. The regime responds to any oppositional organization brutally. 
Schock concludes that the networks and organizations are more likely to remain resilient if 
they can use a variety of responses and interact through any non-state controlled means 
(Schock 2005). He argues that network-oriented organizations and decentralized structures 
are the most pragmatic mobilizing strategies in nondemocracies. To support his claim, 
Schock studied a variety of non-violent movements in nondemocracies such as South Africa, 
the Philippines, Nepal, Thailand, Burma, and China. 
Schock‘s findings show how the United Democratic Front in South Africa, and the 
coalition of the New Nationalist Alliance and the United Democratic Opposition in the 
Philippines, through decentralized structures, could help the labor movements to endure 
despite a violent crackdown by the authorities. His research explores how, based on the 
51 
 
decentralized organization of the Campaign for Popular Democracy in Thailand, and through 
a network-oriented system of the Nepali Congress Party, the United Left Front, and the 
United National People‘s Movement, enabled non-violent movements in these countries to 
sustain under intense repression and promoted a political realignment towards opponents‘ 
favor. Finally, Schock explains how the Solidarity movement in Gdansk, equipped with a 
decentralized organization which is loosely connected through underground links, was able 
to survive the brutal oppression of Polish security forces, in spite of the imprisonment of their 
leaders (Schock 2005). 
Caniglia and Carmin explore the following SMO factors that cause variation in 
political opportunity: number of organizations and their membership status; networking, 
which facilitates contention and promotes coordination; personal relationships, associations, 
unions, and clubs for better and more recruitment (Caniglia and Carmin 2005). They contend 
that SMO research within political opportunity tradition can be classified into two major 
categories. ―The first considers the relationship between SMOs and their external 
environments. Studies in this area continue to investigate how SMOs respond to changes in 
political conditions by examining them in a variety of national and sub-national contexts‖ 
(Caniglia and Carmin 2005, 204). Anthony Oberschall and Elena Zdravomyslova recognize 
that SMOs respond to their socio-political contexts in their studies and show how strategic 
SMOs are. 
Oberschall studied (1996) political opportunities in the Eastern European revolts of 
1989 within four countries: Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. He argues 
for the critical role of opportunities in Eastern block democracy movements. Failure in 
―legitimacy‖ he mentions, ―that is, citizens‘ moral approval‖ of those Eastern authorities 
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provided the best opportunity for contention. His research explores how leaders and 
oppositional elites under a Communist regime formed scattered and loose clusters of groups 
based on personal bonds that led to successful mass mobilizations. 
Zdravomyslova (1996) studies political opportunities in Russia‘s transition to 
democracy. She explores how two social movement organizations, one radical and the other 
moderate, took advantage of Gorbachev‘s reforms and facilitated a transition to democracy 
through symbolic framing. According to her findings during Russia‘s cycles of contention, 
opportunities expanded and social movement organizations populated rapidly. 
―The presence and impact of relations among organizations, both as networks and 
coalitions, is the second stream of SMO research in political process tradition‖ (Caniglia and 
Carmin, 2005, p.205). Charles Kurzman‘s study of four religious movements has shed light 
on another aspect of SMO response to political opportunities: the role of pre-existing 
organizations in a movement‘s success and failure. He examines how pre-existing 
organizations facilitate mobilization and provide resources for sustained contention to a 
movement (Kurzman 1998). In his study of the Iranian revolutionary movement in the Shi‘a 
Muslim ruhaniyat, he explores activism within the Shi‘a community after the death of Grand 
Ayatollah Burujerdi. Kurzman‘s study shows that after Burujerdi‘s death, the Shi‘a ruhaniyat 
community lost its centrality. Khomeini took advantage of this opportunity and by 
networking the mosques and mobilizing them against the Shah, prepared the settings for the 
revolution of 1979. But soon after the revolution succeeded, Khomeini as the new grand 
ayatollah centralized his control over ruhaniyat establishment (Kurzman, 1998). According 
to Kurzman‘s findings, ―religious institutions with greater organizational opportunity were 
partially or fully mobilized for social movement activism. But institutions with less 
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organizational opportunity were less mobilized for social movement activism‖ (Kurzman 
1998, 42). 
Suzanne Staggenborg, Beth Schaefer Caniglia and JoAnn Carmin (2005) mention that 
in the absence of a favorable political and social context, SMOs help movements endure. 
Research works conducted on the women‘s liberation movement and the civil rights 
movement in the U.S. demonstrate the important role of informal networks formed among 
participants in these movements (McAdam 1988). 
Joe Freeman (1972) in her research on the women‘s liberation movement explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of ―structurelessness‖. She argues although this approach is 
effective during the formation phase of a movement and for raising awareness, it is not 
successful in getting goals accomplished. She declares that a more effective movement 
should employ the following attitudes: task delegation, responsibility, authority distribution, 
task circulation, information diffusion, and having equal access over organizational 
resources. 
Suzanne Staggenborg (1989) in her comparative study of two movement 
organizations explores the impact of ideology and structure on SMOs‘ approach to solve 
organizational issues. She argues that movements with formalized and centralized structures 
maintain better and are more effective in institutionalized change, but informal and 







Referring to Tarrow‘s dilemma of movement organization7, Schock contends formal, 
informal, or hybrid structures are more a matter of choice in democratic countries. While in 
nondemocracies, where authorities can destroy any centralized structure easily, decentralized 
structures are necessary if opposition groups want to succeed (Schock, 2005). In 
nondemocracies, transforming public opinion or a conviction that a problem exists into a 
form of collective action requires greater organizational efforts (Swain 2001). 
Political process scholars believe that political opportunities and mobilizing structures 
are not sufficient factors for collective action to occur. Intervening between opportunities and 
mobilization is the framing process (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, Tarrow 1998). 
According to Oliver and Johnston (2000) ―the role of movement leaders is not to direct, but 
orchestrate, facilitate, and enable a movement to grow, by creating the receptive context for 
its formation‖ (Bate et al. 2005, 33). Between being aggrieved and daily routines there 
should be a horizon promising enough that if the group acts collectively there will be 
achievements (Bate et al. 2005, McAdam 1996). Snow and Benford (1988) recognized three 
types of framing: addressing a problem (diagnostic); designing appropriate logistics 
(prognostic); and awakening emotions (motivational) (Bate et al. 2005). Tarrow (1998) 
argues framing is a process that needs to be learned while people are in struggle. Between the 
values they share and their differences there is something (e.g., symbols) appealing enough 
rooted in the common cultural context of the participants that could lead to a successful 
mobilization. 
 
                                                          
7 ―The dilemma of hierarchical movement organization is that, when they permanently internalize their base, 
they lose their capacity for disruption, but when they move in the opposite direction, they lack the infrastructure 
to maintain a sustained interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters‖ (Tarrow 1998, 137). 
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Mario Diani (1996) has conducted a research on the Northern League in Italy in a 
historical context and has assessed the relationship between mobilization frames and political 
opportunities. His findings show the variations of political alignments based on different 
opportunities available within Italian polity.  Based on the degree of opportunity for having 
political access, and the degree of opportunity to create a crisis, Diani introduces four 
framing strategies: realignment, anti-system, inclusion, and revitalization. 
Table 4 – Most Successful Framing Strategies, 
according to different configurations of the political Opportunity Structure8 
 Opportunities for Autonomous Action within the Polity 
Opportunities  
Created by the Crisis 
of Dominant 
Cleavages 
 High Low 
High Realignment Frames Anti-System Frames 
Low Inclusion Frames Revitalization Frames 
 
Since democratic states show a higher degree of tolerance for opposition and the 
society is open, framing is easier and more effective within a democratic system. In 
nondemocracies, a shift in alignment is a sign of contention and framing realignment 
jeopardizes the regime‘s legitimacy which could eventually lead to a movement. 
Nondemocratic states respond to any realignment with an iron fist and create a shadow of 
fear over their nation (Schock 2005). 
In sum, according to Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2004) ―the political process 
model claims that social movements result when expanding political opportunities are seized 
by people who are formally organized, aggrieved, and optimistic that they can successfully 
redress their concerns‖ (p. 17). In the following sections I will discuss social movement 
                                                          
8 Source: Diani, Mario. 1996. Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: Insights from Regional 
Populism in Italy, American Sociological Review, vol. 61, December, 1053-1069, Figure 1, p. 1056. 
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organizations (SMOs) and their different configurations, as facilitators for mobilization, in 
more detail.  
 
Defining a Social Movement Organization 
Scholars in the field of social movements have been mostly focused on the causes that lead 
people to participate in movements rather than the endurance of the movement. Some 
scholars like Meyer and Tarrow are more interested in studying strategic views and 
organizational structures behind movements that endure after their emergence and peak time. 
According to some scholars, when a movement is in its infancy, it does not enjoy a well-
structured organization. ―Movement organizations not only develop internally but also put 
their energies into building other kinds of movement-related organizations - usually after 
their protest related activities decline‖ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 19). 
Social movement organizations (SMOs) ―are associations of persons making 
idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought be organized 
that, at the time of their claims-making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society 
- the then dominant constructions of what is realistic, reasonable and moral‖ (Lofland 1998, 
3). The National Organization for Women of the Women‘s Liberation movement, the 
Berkeley Free Speech Movement of the student movement, Association of Community 
Organizations for Reform Now, and Congregation Based/Church Based Community 
Organizations, are examples of social movement organizations in the United States. 
Movements have diverse organizational roles ranging from transforming a 
contentious event to a sustained mobilization to producing leadership out of contention. 
Sidney Tarrow argues that confusion about a movement‘s organization and its role is rooted 
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in the three-fold meaning of the concept, namely: ―formal hierarchical organization, the 
organization of collective action at the point of contact with opponents, and connective 
structures‖ (Tarrow 1998, 123-4). 
Social movement organizations and formal organizations share many characteristics 
such as members, place, partially recognized as a player in the polity, and practices (Davis, et 
al. 2005). According to Heidi Swarts, organizations provide the best grounds for their 
members/participants to experience civic society, practice to be influential, and get 
acquainted with new ideas and cultures (Swarts 2008). 
Social movement organizations vary in respect to the following attributes (Lofland 
1996, 141-149): 
Membership: some organizations have individual members and some of them are coalitions 
of organizations. In both cases they have at least two members for the membership to exist. 
Some with many members might even include a membership department (Lofland 1996). 
Fragility and Temporariness: some organizations are fragile either because of their limited 
participation in protests or because of a naïve strategy vulnerable to repression by the 
authorities (Lofland 1996). On the other hand, some organizations are temporary although 
they enjoy a robust structure. These types of organizations, after achieving their goals, fade 
out. There are also movement organizations that persist and involve themselves in electoral 
politics such as the Green Party of Germany. 
Formalization and Centralization: some organizational structures are hierarchical, some 
informal, and some in between these two. Some organizations enjoy a centralized leadership, 
some have an effective board of leaders, and some of them follow a charismatic leader 
(Lofland 1996; Tarrow 1998). 
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Diversity: some organizations have members from different facets of the society and are 
diverse. Other organizations recruit a specific class or group in the society. 
Hierarchical and Geographical Scales: hierarchical scale distinguishes among 
organizations that are local, national organizations with local chapters, or national 
organizations without local chapters (Lofland 1996, Davis et al. 2005). 
Democratic and Oligarchic: oligarchy in the SMO literature refers to Robert Michels‘ ―Iron 
Law of Oligarchy‖. Michels argues that even in the democratic context of an association, 
oligarchy is unavoidable (Lofland 1996). Tarrow interprets the term as ―over time, 
organizations displace their original goals, become wedded to routine and ultimately accept 
the rules of the game of the existing system‖ (Tarrow 1998, 123). John Lofland argues that 
movement organizations‘ tendency at the beginning is toward democracy but they will turn 
into oligarchy eventually. According to Tarrow, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine proposed 
a ―decentralized, segmented, and reticulated‖ model that broke the Iron Law. Their 
organizational structure contains loosely coordinated units enabled for disruption and 
autonomous enough for participation with no central leadership. This structure keeps 
activism alive and makes revival possible for future political opportunities (Tarrow 1998). 
 
How to Identify a SPR Organization 
Not all social movements endure. But if they last, social movements retain an organizational 
structure. Movement organizations follow an evolution-like process during different stages in 
the cycle of contention. In the mobilization phase, protests and demonstrations are not 
organized, but as they transition to other phases their organizational structure becomes well-
defined. A ―well-structured‖ organization, as Kriesi at al. (1995) define, has the following 
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dimensions: ―formalization, professionalization, centralized control, well-financed 
operations, and large number of supportive members‖ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 19). Gerald 
F. Davis et al. (2005) compare SMOs with formal organizations and argue that both types of 
organizations share the following characteristics: ―a known location and group of 
participants, recognition as a more or less legitimate player, and some continuity of mission 
and routines‖ (p. 189). Over time, movement organizations develop different components 
like ―authority structure, and strategic leadership‖ (Davis et al. 2005, 189), or take on 
different political and non-political roles such as political parties and interest groups, or 
NGOs (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). 
Luther Gerlach and Gary Palmer (1981) explore the relation between resource 
fluctuations and the formation of polycentric networks. They refer to findings of Pradip 
Khandwala (1981), and Fred Emery and Eric Trist (1965, 1973) as other cases elaborating 
the direct impact of resource fluctuations on political and economic decentralization. 
Khandwala (1981) explained the adaptation procedure of societal segments to resource 
fluctuations through decentralization. Emery and Trist (1965, 1973) suggested that 
―organizations in disturbed-reactive environments become flexible, a property which 
encourages a certain decentralization and also puts a premium on quality and speed of 
decision at various peripheral points‖ (Gerlach and Palmer 1981, 363). 
According to Emery and Trist (1965) organizations adopt various strategies during 
turbulent times. One strategy is for organizations to maximize cooperation, while not taking 
over each other‘s role. Gerlach and Palmer (1981) argue that facing turbulent situations with 
more innovative strategies than Emery and Trist‘s ―organizational matrices‖, created to 
empower organizations ―not only to cope with turbulent fields, but also to shape turbulent 
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fields to suit their objectives and to generate changes which create turbulence‖ (Gerlach and 
Palmer 1981, 364). This more innovative strategic model is segmented, polycentric, and 
reticulated. Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine developed this model based on field studies of 
the Black Power, Pentecostal, and Environmental movements, as well as a literature review 
of other movements such as Protestantism in sixteenth-century Europe, Sufism in Persia to 
protest Arab domination, and the anti-colonial Mau Mau movement in Kenya. 
John D. McCarthy‘s (2005) research on federated social movements in the United 
States shows that in spite of daily increasing number of Robert Putnam‘s ―social movements 
without members‖, nationally federated and polycentric movement organizations are pretty 
much alive. He also argues that when these decentralized structures get trapped in 
organizational logistics and formality, the opportunities for their participants‘ activism 
decline.  
Jackie Smith (2005) conducted research on the effects of globalization on 
transnational social movements. She suggests a coalition approach based on a decentralized 
and informal structure for transnational movements. She argues that in this case the shared 
ideological and organizational rules and procedures remain minimal and limited and coalition 
organizations can maintain their autonomy while active in a shared framework with others. 
Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine (1981) closely examined the Black Power and 
Pentecostal movements. According to these scholars, people in general and even many of the 
participants in both movements believe that either the movements are centrally controlled or 
they are random grassroots outrages. Based on their observations, Gerlach and Hine 
described a third form of organization. ―A movement is neither an amorphous collectively 
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nor a highly centralized autocracy, but one that was a segmentary, polycentric, and 
reticulated (acronym SPR)‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 78, Gerlach 2001, 289). 
Segmentary - ―Composed of many diverse group, which grow and die, divide and defuse, 
proliferate and contract‖ (Gerlach 2001, 289). 
Polycentric - ―Having multiple, often temporary, and sometimes competing leaders or 
centers of influence‖ (Gerlach 2001, 289). 
Reticulated - ―Forming a loose, reticulated, integrated network with multiple linkages 
through travelers, overlapping membership, joint activities, common reading matter, and 
shared ideals and opponents‖ (Gerlach 2001, 289). 
Based on this model, decentralization, segmentation, and reticulation have to do with 
decision making, compositional structure, and bridging respectively. SPR organizational 
structure lacks a central leadership, but may enjoy a charismatic leader or a leadership board. 
This prevents the decision-making unit of an organization from ruling the entire movement‘s 




A segmentary movement consists of a wide variety of, nationally and/or internationally, 
autonomous cells or units. These constituent elements can join together and form a bigger 
cell, or they can divide to smaller cells. The new segments either preserve the functionality of 
its components or take on a new role. As a result of appending and splitting, participants in a 
movement could be affiliated to more than one segment (Gerlach and Hine 1981, Gerlach 
2001). Gerlach and Hine (1981) argue that in a segmentary movement, like Black Power or 
Pentecostalism, each component has its own interpretation of the movement‘s ideology and 
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therefore, different cells employ different means to achieve the goals of the movement.
 Studies on the religious movements of the 1960s and the environmental movement in 
the United States led scholars to recognize different sources for segmentation process in a 
movement: ―personal power, pre-existing cleavages, competition, ideological differences‖ 
(Gerlach 2001, 291-292).  
Personal Power: According to Gerlach (2001), participants in the movement, individuals or 
groups, operate based on a genuine feeling that they are key elements of the movement, who 
have access to all available resources, and are responsible for the movement‘s achievement. 
―They don‘t wait to be asked‖ (Ibid, 291). ―Individual initiative, independent action, and 
personal responsibility‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 43) encourage participants to form new 
action-cells and advocate for their own means to achieve the movement‘s ends. 
Pre-existing cleavages: Cleavages are reflected in two operational levels of a segmentary 
movement, recruitment and factionalism. Differences have variety of roots: socio-economic, 
educational, geographical, or personal. According to Gerlach and Hine (1981) there were two 
main sources for segmentation in the Pentecostal movement of Latin America: participants‘ 
socio-economic backgrounds and cleavages among the American missionaries. People with 
friendship and kinship ties get together and form a new active-cell, or members of a local 
group try to recruit a new member with different background to add diversity to their group 
and practice tolerance. 
Competition: Movement participants compete over the variety of rewards and benefits. 
Rewards such as ―economic, political, social, and psychological‖, and benefits such as 
―followers, media attention, influence, funds and personal satisfaction‖ (Gerlach 2001). 
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Ideological differences: Participants in a movement come from different ideological trends 
based on the socio-political and cultural context in which a movement is mobilized. When 
some members divide over ideology, they either reject each other and choose separate paths, 
or accept each other and choose symbiosis. ―Most division occurs during the growth phase of 




A polycentric social movement has different leaders and headquarters. The leaders are not 
under a central and coherent leader. It may enjoy, sporadically, a charismatic leadership. A 
charismatic leadership usually appears based on some critical circumstances when an 
individual comes up with a solution for challenges in the way of a movement. The leaders do 
not have power to rule over an entire movement. Personal strength and a non-violent 
approach are main characteristics of a good leader, which can lead a movement to 
successfully challenge the authority and at the same time foster the contention. ―Thus a 




As discussed before, a movement has different components or active-cells. These many units 
are not detached, but attached. They are connected through a horizontal social relation, a 
collective identity, and a shared opponent. Through a network structure, participants 
exchange information, recruit new members, organize simultaneous actions in different 
places, and attract new resources (Gerlach 2001). In another word, reticulation is a network 
that connects various segments to each other and equips them with communication channels.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the main components of a reticulation system namely, linkages, linkages 
and information sharing, and integrating factors. Linkages include: personal ties, travelling 
evangelists and visitors, large gatherings, communication technologies, and extra movement 
linkages. Shared opposition and shared ideology are two key components almost common 
amongst a movement‘s participants. Different segments of SPR organization exchange ideas 
and share information through a wide variety of communication tools (Gerlach and Hine 
1981, 55-63; Gerlach 2001, 296-302). 
Mark Granovetter in his outstanding study (1983), The Strength of Weak Ties: a 
Network Theory Revised, recognizes two different sets of social relations: close friendships 
(strong ties), and acquaintances (weak ties). Every individual in the society, according to 
Granovetter, more or less, establishes both kinds of ties. According to this perspective every 
person has some close friends and some acquaintances, who in turn have some close friends 
and acquaintances. Therefore, a social network is a mesh or cluster of close friends 
interlinked through their acquaintances. According to Granovetter ―weak ties provide people 
with access to information and resources beyond those available in their own social circle; 
but strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily 
available‖ (Granovetter 1983, 209). In other words, employing Tarrow‘s ―novelty‖ concept 
into Granovetter‘s ―weak ties theory‖ crystallizes Snow‘s ―mobilzation vehicle‖. 
Borrowing from Tarrow and rephrasing it with Granovetter‘s terminology, one of my 
arguments is that what underlies the most successful of social movement organizations is the 
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Granovetter‘s findings are: 
 Weak ties are key players for diffusion of innovations (Granovetter 1983, 214), 
 Weak ties are bridges over which information crosses the boundaries of  social groups 
(Ibid, 219), 
 Strong ties have the main impact on the decision-making process (Ibid, 219), 
 The more the number of weak ties, the more the possibility of mobilization (Ibid, 
224). 
Robert Putnam‘s (2000) ―social capital‖ theory is based on weak ties and strong ties, 
although through a different terminology. Putnam refers to strong ties as ―bonding capital‖ 
and to weak ties as ―bridging capital‖. Putnam argues that ―for a successful mobilization, the 
ideal groups‘ structure should be the ones which bond along some social dimensions and 
bridge across others‖ (Swain 2001, 17). 
In his research conducted on the role of civic networks, Diani and Baldassarri (2007) 
recognize two types of social ties for coordination across a polycentric network: social 
bounds and transactions. ―Social bonds actually characterize dense clusters within broader 
networks, while transactions facilitate links between almost disconnected subgroups‖ (760). 
Borrowing from Tarrow and rephrasing it with Putnam‘s terminology, my second 
strong argument is that a successful movement organization must maintain a delicate balance 
between its bonding capital and bridging capital with respect to the hierarchical movement 
organization it employs. 
As stated before, a reticulation structure is a network that connects various segments 
of a movement to each other through different personal, organizational, and extra linkages 
and equips them with communication channels. 
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Personal ties: There are different sources for personal ties. Participants connect with each 
other through ―kinship, marriage, friendship, neighborliness, and other associations‖ 
(Gerlach 2001, 296). The majority of personal ties are considered as strong ties and they 
remain between participants even if a group breaks into smaller cells. According to Gerlach 
(2001), some high profile members, or leaders, in a movement are generally active in more 
than one cell and this turns them into a node through which several groups are bridged 
together. 
Travelling Evangelists: Evangelists are activists who travel across the network, from one 
city to another, from one campaign to another campaign, and spread the word of a 
movement. I call them a ‗mobile knot‘ of a movement that bridges many groups and knits 
weak ties together. 
Large gatherings: Gatherings provide opportunities for participants to share information and 
exchange ideas. Different sorts of gathering are: seminars, conferences, workshops, 
conventions, general meetings, and demonstrations (Gerlach 2001). 
Communications technologies: They provide participants great means for out reach 
activities: internet, TV, radio, newsletters, newspapers, fax, weblogs, emails, YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter. 
Mario Diani (2000) explores the role of computer mediated communication on social 
movements. He argues that virtual networks of communication assist activists in their 
solidarity and collective identity. He declares that web technologies are very helpful for 
mobilization and modify operational means of SMOs. 
Extra-movement linkages: The structure of a social movement not only depends on the 
various relationships within the movement community, but also depends on ―the reticulation 
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formed by various types of linkages among otherwise unrelated cells or some groups of 
cells‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 61). 
Diani (1997) in his study on the relation between social movements and social capital 
explores the capacity of social movements to build new ties. He argues that to be innovative, 
social movements not only rely on their preexisting networks, but also they need to extend 
their social capital within societal arenas and political elites. 
Shared opposition: A main reason that maintains diverse groups together in a movement is a 
common opposition. Movements and their oppositions are in a direct relation with each 
other. The stronger a movement, the stronger its opposition becomes, ―much as a kite flies 
against the wind‖ (Gerlach 2001). 
Shared ideology: According to Gerlach (2001), movement ideology has two distinct 
functionalities: participants use them as movement mottos or slogans, and different 
interpretations. Gerlach argues that apart from divisions that can happen over different 
interpretations of ideology, sometimes core beliefs can rule over a movement and even 
reshape the discourse of a society. He explains how, after ‗ecology‘ entered to the public 
knowledge, ―the prefix ‗eco‘ became widely used to give new meaning to other words, i.e. 
ecofeminism‖ (Ibid, p. 301). 
Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust (1994) define a social network: ―a network consists 
of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them‖ (p. 20). The 
―relational information‖ is the key characteristic of a social network. In a relational approach 
the main components of analysis are linkages among units, whereas, in a positional approach 
underlying social structures are the main components of analysis (Saunders 2007). 
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Wasserman and Faust recognize the following as important while studying a social 
network: 
 Actor and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent units, 
 Relational ties, weak or strong, bond or bridge, between actors are channels for both 
information flow and diffusion of novel repertoire, 
 Opportunities and constraints for mobilization are created by the network structural 
environment (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 4). 
In recent years social science scholars have employed social network analysis methods to 
study a wide range of topics from social movement organizations to political violence and 
terrorism (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006, Ray et al. 2003, Saunders 2007, Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). 
Ashok Swain in his research on the relationship between social networks and social 
movements cited studies conducted by David Snow and his colleagues (1980) on the 
importance of social relations, especially pre-existing ties, as an innovative tactic for 
mobilization. They employed social network analysis and ―demonstrated that social ties were 
instrumental in drawing new members into the movement. … Most of recruits were 
mobilized through a friend or relative previously associated with it‖ (Swain 2001, 14-15). 
Social networking and social ties are cornerstones of a movement. It is through these 
structures that people are recruited, mobilized and retained. Social ties cross the 
organizational boundaries of a movement and reach out for new resources for struggle, new 
leaders, new channels for communication and finally the target of the contention (Bate, 
Bevan and Robert 2005). 
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Clare Saunders (2007) explores relational ties between different types of 
organizations participating in a London based environmental movement. Saunders prefers 
relational approach to positional method since her interest is to study the impact of different 
ideologies on an organization‘s relations within the environmental movement. Saunders 
findings show that radical organizations, in contrast with reformists, do not share their 
information with the rest of the movement and tend to act isolated. 
Kathryn Ray et al. (2003) explore the relation between network structure and the 
socio-demographic structure of the members of an organization. They study three social 
movement organizations in the northern part of England: a local Labor Party, an 
environmental group, and a conservative group. Their findings show that core members, 
members who are the most active, in each of these organizations have more strong ties within 
their organizations. In addition, in a case of well-established organizations, weak ties or 
bridging capital are not crucial mobilization factors. 
Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger (2006) in The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A 
Social Network Perspective argue that local activists, rather than decision processes within a 
terrorist organization, make decisions about a suicide operation. Their findings show that 
―networks of suicide bombers are local and cross-organizational; networks have hubs rather 
than leaders‖; and suicide bombers are not central figures in the network, rather ―they come 
from the environment close to the network to carry out the operation‖ (p. 1995-6). 
David Snow and his colleagues (1980) examine the relationship between movement 
networks and recruitment strategies. Their findings confirm the important role of preexisting 
ties, and the absence of competing groups in recruitment processes and the growth of a 
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movement. Their results show the relative openness of a movement‘s social network and how 
its members both have structural influence on the spread and growth of a movement. 
Gerlach and Hine (1981) have explored recruitment processes in the Black Power and 
Pentecostal movements. According to interviews they conducted with the activists of both 
movements, face-to-face recruitment is mentioned as the most important factor for the 
growth of the movements. Their findings show that recruitment emerges from preexisting 
relations, new participants are recruited to segments rather than the movement, and 
committed ordinary participants are more active than leaders in recruitment process. 
Jo Freeman (1979) in her study explores formations of four social movements: civil 
rights, student protest, welfare rights, and women‘s liberation. She recognizes the importance 
of the preexisting communication network as the necessary pre-condition for mobilization. 
Freeman argues that it is not communication networks per se, rather their cooptation 
characteristic that lead to collective actions. She concludes a contention will turn into 
mobilization only if a well structured network exists, or the activists are linked together by 
some trained organizers. 
Mario Diani (2000) in his research on social movements and their capacities to 
develop a system of relationships among individuals with different socio-political cleavages, 
shows the more the number of bridges over cleavages, the more a social movement can 
embrace the newness and the more it stands away from traditional class based movements. 
He argues that it is important to identify patterns of ties, rather than their mere existence, 
among activists and movement organizations, to determine for if ties are within subcultures 
or between subcultures as well, or if linkages are specialized or diversified. He concludes that 
the innovation of a social movement lies in its ability to develop constant networking and 
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solidarity building within new emerging subcultures. Diani (2009) has conducted research on 
different demonstrations on March 15th 2003 across the world, opposing the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq. His findings not only confirm the role of associations (i.e. peace groups) for 
mobilizations, but also show the impact of an informal network of ―protest communities, sets 
of activists sharing a sustained participation in protest activities,‖ (63) on mobilization. This 
study confirms the level of innovation in protest communities in solidarity building over 
cross cultural cleavages, and different political contexts. 
Jo Freeman (1979) in her comparative study between the civil rights movement and 
the women‘s liberation movement explains four main components for a more effective 
strategic decision making: ―mobilizable resources, constraints on these resources, SMO 
structure and internal environment, and expectations about potential targets.‖ She compares 
two main SMO structures: the centralized, hierarchical organization, and the decentralized, 
segmented, and reticulated organization. While the former enjoys a ―well-developed division 
of labor‖, the latter has ―at best a simple division of labor‖. She argues that a centralized 
structure is better for achieving narrow goals, but a decentralized one has better ability for 
recruitment. Freeman concludes, survival is not the main issue for a centralized structure, 
whereas a decentralized approach is all about survival. 
Diani (2003) in his research on networks and social movements describes two main 
dimensions of networks: centralized vs. decentralized structures, and segmented vs. 
reticulated structures. Based on these dimensions he introduces four types of network 





Table 510 – Four Types of Network Structures 
 
Type Pattern of 
Linkages 
Reticulation Segmentation Decentralization Key Characteristics 
 
Clique 
Figure 3 – A 
strong, 
redundancy of 
ties, all nodes 
are adjacent 
to each other 
high null yes less opportunity for external 
engagements, 
configuration may have ideological, 
cultural, or specific issue base 
 
Polycephalous 




no partially relatively 
centralized 
some actors are involved in more links, 
and are able to control relational flows 
within the network 
 
Wheel/Star 









individual holding the central position 










no high high actors largely operate either on their 






                                                          
10 Source for Table 5 and Figure 3: Mario Diani, "Networks and Social Movements: A Research Program," in Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds., Social 
Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 307–312 (Figs 13.1–13.4) 
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Figure 3 –Illustrations of Four Types of Network Structures 
 
                                                                                                            
                                
   A: Decentralized, Reticulated Network                                          B: Centralized, Segmented Structure                          
                                        
               C: Centralized, Non-Segmented Network                                       D: Segmented, Decentralized Network                          
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SPR Adaptive Functions 
 
According to Gerlach (2001) this organizational structure ―supports rapid organizational 
growth in the face of strong opposition, inspires personal commitment, and flexibly adapts to 
rapidly changing conditions‖ (Gerlach 2001, 303). SPR is highly adaptive for the following 
seven reasons. 1- Since it is a scattered cluster of units and each unit is autonomous though 
interlinked with the others, it can survive despite its partial destruction. 2- It is diverse and 
recruits from a wide range of backgrounds and interests. 3- The more diverse and the greater 
the numbers of groups, the more the number of sympathizers to advance the goals of the 
movement. 4- It helps that each part of the movement learns from others‘ failure or success. 
5- Competition between different groups and leaders prevents one part of the movement from 
giving in to the demands of authority, and if it does the rest respond harshly. 6- It adapts 
previously approved socio-cultural forms. 7- It is innovative (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 63-78; 
Gerlach and Palmer 1981, Gerlach 2001, 302-307). 
According to Walter Powell (1990), Robert Burrowes (1996), and Schock who 
studied decentralized contentions in nondemocracies or under colonization there are  
different advantages a decentralized, network-oriented structure has over a hierarchical 
system: enhancement of learning ability among participants; diffusion of information and 
repertoire of contention through horizontal and grapevine communication; bridge over 
cleavages to strengthen the collective identity; and minimize the likelihood of state 
repression (Schock 2005). 
Schock‘s findings show that non-violent movements with a broader range of 
repertoire and ability to challenge the regime in different ―spaces‖ and at multiple ―places‖ 
are more likely to remain resilient and achieve their demands (Schock, 2005). 
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Gaps in the Literature 
 
A look at previous studies reveals a number of areas in which the social movement literature 
is underspecified. The first three areas have already been mentioned by other scholars like 
Schock (2005). I hope this study sheds some light on these areas, and adds to the developing 
literature on the comparative study of movement mobilization through social networking in 
nondemocracies: 
National/International Opportunities: Most of the scholarly works about social movement 
organizations and the political process model concentrate on national opportunities (Schock 
2005). According to Schock, ―the international context may influence political contention by 
shaping the balance of power within countries or indirectly through its impact on national 
political structure‖ (Schock 2005, 154). This thesis, in addition to national opportunities, 
studies how a movement‘s reticulation structure can challenge the authority and change the 
political context in its favor with the help of international opportunities. 
Repression - Contention Relationship: According to Schock the relationship between 
repression and contention needs more investigation. It is not clear, based on the literature, 
when repression expedites or delimits contention (Shock 2005). This thesis examines the 
relationship between the Islamic regime‘s levels of despotism and the mobilization capacity 
of an organization according to its kind of reticulation. 
Reshaping Political Context:  Schock argues that most of the social movement scholars are 
interested in a way that movements respond to political opportunities, while it is also 
important to consider how movements are able to reshape political context in their favor 
when an opportunity exists (Schock 2005). This paper tries to show how the organizations 
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under study not only respond to available opportunities but also reshape the political scene in 
their favor based on the kind of their reticulation architecture. 
Theocracy: The political context of the movement organizations being studied is a theocratic 
system. The scholarly works reviewed are either based on a democratic system or a non-
democratic/dictatorship framework. According to Schock, nondemocratic systems through a 
shadow of fear try to force their opponents to compromise. Therefore, dissents within 
nondemocracies ought to be innovative in their frame alignment to lessen fear (Schock 
2005). In a theocratic system like the Islamic Republic any oppositional activity can be 
considered against the Islamic laws and oppressed brutally. For example, in different 
occasions after the disputed Presidential election of June 2009, the regime of Tehran arrested 
a wide range of peaceful protesters on charges such as threatening the national security of the 
country and/or Moharebeh (waging war against God). In January 2010, the regime executed 
two young protesters in their twenties on charge of waging war against God. Thus for the 
movements in Iran the way they frame their alignment to prevent the Islamic Republic‘s 
policy of victory through fear is a key to success. I hope this study can contribute to the 
literature by examining a theocratic regime and these movements‘ ability for mobilization. 
Information Technology and Innovative Repertoire: This research will explore the innovative 
repertoires of these movements rooted in their decentralized and network-oriented natures. 
Especially since communication plays a key role in unarmed contention, I will focus on 
decentralized communication skills that these movements innovate as they progress in their 
struggle. For instance, the people of Iran developed a very innovative strategy to convey their 
messages to the outside world in the absence of the free press and international media 
through Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. They marked the first internet revolution. 
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―Implementing a broad range of methods facilitates mobilization by permitting people with 
different levels of commitment to participate in the struggle‖ (Schock 2005, 167). 
Diaspora Community: The Iranian diaspora has a very decentralized and diverse structure. 
For the past three decades Iranian opposition leaders in exile have been involved in a 
constant contention with the Islamic Republic. There were occasions that their activities 
promoted the struggles of people inside Iran and there were times that their support of the 
movements in Iran was counter productive. This study will consider the role of Iranians in 
exile in providing opportunities for the movements inside Iran. Especially the Iranian 
diaspora, in the very recent struggle after the disputed Presidential election of 2009, showed 
its ability to resonate the people‘s voice of Iran. 
In the existing literature and research we see, that the idea of decentralization (SPR) 
as an effective organizational structure has been addressed by several scholars (Burrows 
1996, Diani 2003, Emery and Trist 1965, 1973, Freeman 1972, Gerlach 2001, Gerlach and 
Hine 1981, Gerlach and Palmer 1981, Khandwala 1981, McCarthy 2005, Powell 1990, 
Schock 2005, Smith 2005, Staggenborg 1989). They find this structure to be adaptive for a 
changing environment. Some research shows its sustainability in turbulent social, cultural, or 
political climates (Gerlach and Hine 1981, Gerlach and Palmer 1981, Gerlach 2001, Emery 
and Trist 1965, 1973, Khandwala 1981). Some scholars find it‘s innovation under 
nondemocracies to be critical to its effectiveness (Burrowes 1996, Powell 1990, Schock 
2005). Although decentralization as an initial approach for contention is approved by many, 
some scholars place limitations on the degree to which decentralization can be effective 
(Diani 2003, Freeman 1972, Staggenborg 1989). 
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Social networks and preexisting ties are often seen to be key components to current 
social movement formation (Diani 2003, Freeman 1972, Gerlach 2001, Gerlach and Hine 
1981, Gerlach and Palmer 1981, Staggenborg 1989, Swain 2001). Social and cultural ties or 
bonds are also discussed in context of how relationships can be formed within and between 
various segments of a movement (Diani 1997, Diani 2003, Diani and Baldassarri 2007, 
Freeman 1972, Gerlach 2001, Gerlach and Hine 1981, Gerlach and Palmer 1981, Granovetter 
1983, Pedahzur and Perliger 2006, Putnam 2000, Ray et al 2003, Snow et al 1980, Saunders 
2007, Tarrow 1998, Wasserman and Faust 1994). Some scholars also bring up emerging 
networks which support mobilization and relationships to extend awareness (Diani 2000). 
Both Preexisting ties and new recruitment to movements are also addressed by scholars 
(Gerlach and Hine 1981, Snow et al 1980). The existing and emerging of new 
communication technologies, including web-based, have been addressed by scholars as a key 
component of reticulation (Diani 2000, Freeman 1999, Gerlach and Hine 1981, Gerlach 
2001). 
Based on the existing literature on decentralized organizational approach and social 
networks I propose that the nature of a movement‘s reticulation structure affects a 
movement‘s behavior. In chapter five, where I will study the Iranian student movement and 
women‘s movement in depth I will develop the specific connection between varied 






4. Research Method 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the research method I applied to study the nature of the 
organizational structure of the student movement and the women‘s movement from 1997 to 
2008. I explain the independent variables, the movement‘s structure and availability of 
opportunities, the dependent variable, the movement‘s behavior, and sources for data 
collection. Finally, I will define these variables into measurable factors. 
Luther Gerlach, Virginia Hine, Sidney Tarrow, Kurt Schock, Robert Burrowes and 
other scholars have arrived at a consensus that the SPR model is the most effective 
organizational structure that can adapt rapidly to environmental changes, survive between 
cycles of contention, resurface quickly, and innovate. This decentralized model is of more 
importance within non-democratic systems, where there is much lower tolerance towards 
dissent activity, and brutality is the response of the authorities to any contention (Schock 
2005). 
 This study compares two movement organizations in Iran: the student movement and 
the women‘s movement. Both enjoy a decentralized structure. Table 6 provides a brief 
summary of these movements‘ organizations, their mobilization vehicles, and their main SPR 
characteristics. I will study these movements in a comparative framework in post-
revolutionary Iran. 
To minimize the comparative research syndrome – ―many variables, small N‖ - I tried 
to observe and follow Arend Lijphart‘s comparative methods (Lijphart 1975, 159). It was not 
possible to ―extend the analysis both geographically and historically‖. The study is about 
social movements in Iran, so was bound geographically to Iran. The period of this study is 
from 1997 to 2008. This is a crucial period when one can observe the resurfacing of social-
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political activism (although very limited) in the society after 17 years, starting with 
Khatami‘s presidential campaign in 1997. Within this timeframe a gradual closing down of 
activism started in 2004 when the conservative bloc dominated the seventh Majles and the 
outcome of the presidential election of 2005 marked a return to revolutionary values of 1979 
followed by a shift toward an Islamic militarized state. 
By focusing on ―one state or a particular type of state‖ as Ashok Swain argues, Iran 
and the Islamic Republic in this case, I was able to ―keep the state factor constant‖ which 
creates a situation, where mobilization can be seen and studied in detail (Swain 2001). 
This study tried to ―focus the analysis on comparable cases‖ and ―restricted the 
analysis to the key variables‖ (Lijphart 1975, 159). The student movement and women‘s 
movement in Iran are similar in a number of ways: they both occur within the same 
geographical-cultural context; they challenge the same regime; they experience the same 
level of the state‘s repression; they enjoyed open opportunities, although limited, from 1997 
– 2005; and they faced with closed opportunities and more constraints between 2005 and 
2008. 
Although both of the movements in this study employ a decentralized configuration, their 
organizational structures are different with respect to the nature of segmentation, 
polycentrism, and reticulation. Another difference between the student movement and 
women‘s movement is rooted in perception of their participants of political opportunities, 
and their interpretations of means and ends in contention. These two sets of differences, 







































English Translation:  
the Office for 
Consolidation of Unity 
  
Founded in 1979 as a 
conservative Islamist 
organization protecting 
Islamic values, and 
combating secular 
students in university 
campuses. 
  
Since mid 1990‘s, the 
office has transformed to 
a pro-democracy and 
reform organization. 
  
Students uprising in Capital 
Tehran and major cities. 
  
July 8 - 13, 1999 
  
To protest the brutal 
invasion on Tehran 
University dormitory by the 
regime‘s security forces. 
To challenge Iran‘s 








 No paramilitary 
Basij forces on 
campuses 
















Change for Equality 
  
Founded in 2005 
Initially signed by 54 
individuals 
June 12, 2005 
  
To protest institutionalized 







 Family protection 
law 
 Right to divorce 
 Child‘s Custody 

















Organizational Members: Islamic 
Student Associations 
More than 80 association members 
representing public and private 
higher education centers. 
  
As diverse as possible based on 
the office‘s statute 
  
Condition: student 
Board of leaders reside in the 
main office 
  
Coordinates all offices and 
mobilizes students through its 
members regarding national 
issues 
  
Local leaders in its branches 
with great level of autonomy 
regarding local issues 
  
Decentralized 
Loose integrated network 
Multiple linkages 
Joint activities 
Common reading matter 







Active campaign in more than 25 
cities in Iran 
  
Active campaign in 8 cities around 
the world  
  
As diverse as Iran‘s society 
  
No condition 
No specific leadership 
  
Great coordination through 
personal relationships and other 
intergroup linkages 
Decentralized 





Common reading matter 





The main goal of this paper is to study the organizational structure of the student movement 
and women‘s movement in Iran and its impact on their outcomes. Therefore, a social network 
perspective is employed. But due to the lack of access to solid statistical data and more 
robust empirical evidence with respect to the strength of ties, the density of bonds and the 
exact number of ties/bonds an actor extends, my analysis is based on just the involvement of 
actors and the range of ties. The same token, lack of data, provided me with no choice of 
distinction between actors as initiators (being the source) and receivers (being the recipient) 
of ties. Thus the proposed network structure will be non-directional. 
The sources of data collection included interviews, documents and academic 
literature. Documents include newspapers, organizational websites, blogs, documentaries, 
and video clips. The interviews were conducted with Iranian-American scholars and political 
activists in exile. Among them, there were prominent student activists with leading roles 
between 1997 and 2005, and a women activist and campaigner of the Change for Equality 
Campaign. 
The interviews were both structured and informal. For the structured interview 
protocol conducted for this study refer to Appendix A. The same questions, and in the same 
order were asked of respondents, which enabled me to compare their responses in order to 
test my hypothesis with more confidence. To reach the target population for interview I 
applied snowball sampling.  W. P. Vogt (1999) defines snowball sampling as ―a technique 
for finding research subjects. One subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, 
who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on‖ (Atkinson and Flint 2001). Access to my 
target population for interview was a very difficult task. Considering the difficult situation of 
activists in exile and security measures they observe for themselves snowball method was the 
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only approach. After extensive study and research based on the interviews and academic 
activity I chose my initial contact within the target population. This contact referred me to 
other individuals. The total number of activists I planed to interview was ten, but only five of 
them responded positively to my request for an interview. Three of them were active 
members of the student movement and women‘s movement with pivotal roles between 1997 
and 2007, and provided me with valuable data and empirical evidence. 
I observed some discretion and decided not to reveal the real name of the 
interviewees. Thus I labeled them with other names. I named the male interviewees Dana, 
Pouya, Kara, and the female interviewees Vala, and Ziba. 
I return to my research question: ―How does the reticulation affect a movement‘s 
ability to mobilize and respond to opportunities and to sustain mobilization in the absence of 
opportunities?‖  
The independent variables are the structure of the movement and availability of 
opportunities. The dependent variable is the behavior of the movement. 
I define a movement‘s structure by the following measurable factors: variety of 
segments, polycentrism, and linkages (personal relations, traveling evangelists, large 
gatherings, extra linkages, communication channels). The evidence for structural 
configuration were gathered from my interviews, organizations‘ internet sites and archives, 
secondary documents (interviews with activists by Voice of America, BBC, and Iranian 
satellite channels and radios outside Iran), and studies and articles on the student movement 
and women‘s movement in Iran. 
Political opportunities, in this study, are defined as ―failure of the reform process‖, 
―allies within the polity‖, and ―election‖ factors. Sources of evidence are international press, 
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Iranian news web sites, my interviews, organizations‘ internet sites and archives, secondary 
documents (interviews with activists by Voice of America, BBC, and Iranian satellite 
channels and radios outside Iran), and studies and articles on the student movement and 
women‘s movement in Iran. This study is conducted over two periods when opportunities 
vary with respect to the degree of openness. From 1997 to 2005 a relative openness of 
activism was observed, whereas between 2005 and 2008 activism was faced constraints. 
The movements‘ behaviors are defined based on their sustainability, their response to 
opportunities, and creation of opportunities. Information was collected about the behavior of 
the student movement and women‘s movement from international press, Iranian news web 
sites, my interviews, organizations‘ internet sites and archives, secondary document 
(interviews with activists by Voice of America, BBC, and Iranian satellite channels and 











5. From Organization to Mobilization 
 
In the following sections, after reviewing the analytical framework used for this study I will 
evaluate the behaviors of the student movement and the women‘s movement based on their 
structures and their perception of political opportunities. Part of the discussion will focus on 
the mobilization abilities of the two movements. This chapter will conclude with a summary 
of findings with respect to the movements and propose the hypotheses. 
 
Analytical Framework 
To identify those characteristics which may be responsible for different behaviors of the 
student movement and the women‘s movement in Iran from 1997 to 2008, I designed an 
analytical framework based on the possible factors affecting the movements‘ outcomes 
Figure 4 depicts the model behind the analytical framework. 
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Opportunities 





Both of the movements in Iran are similar in a number of ways: they both occur 
within the same geographical-cultural context; they challenge the same regime; they 
experience the same level of the state‘s repression; they enjoyed open opportunities, although 
limited, from 1997 – 2005; and they faced closed opportunities and more constraints between 
2005 and 2008. But their organizational structures and their perceptions of opportunities are 
different, which has led these movements to behave differently. 
Table 7 summarizes the independent variables and the dependent variables, their 
measurable factors, and the sources of evidence. 
Table 7 – Variables Analyzed in This Study 
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My interviews, organizations‘ 
internet sites and archives, 
secondary documents, and studies 
and articles on the student 
movement and women‘s movement 
in Iran. 
Dependent A Movement‘s 
Behavior 
- Sustainability 
- Response to 
Opportunity 
- Creation of 
Opportunities 
international press, Iranian news 
web sites, my interviews, 
organizations‘ internet sites and 
archives, secondary documents 
(interviews with activists by Voice 
of America, BBC, and Iranian 
satellite channels and radios 









Gerlach and Hine (1981), based on their research and field experience, noticed a third 
type of organization, which is neither centralized, nor a random grassroots outrage; it is 
segmentary, polycentric, and reticulated (Gerlach and Hine 1981). In Iran, the student 
movement, centered on the Office for Consolidation of Unity (the OCU) has employed a 




The student movement is segmentary, as its different components, mostly student groups, 
change through coalition and division. The student movement and its mobilization vehicle 
(the OCU) during Khatami‘s presidency, especially in the aftermath of the July events of 
1999, has gradually distanced itself from the political structure and marked the group‘s 
independence. This has led to a large degree of autonomy for the Office for Consolidation of 
Unity (Allameh trend) and its segments (the Islamic Student Associations (ISA)) throughout 
campuses. 
 There are different sources for segmentation process in a movement: ―personal 
power, pre-existing cleavages, and ideological differences‖ (Gerlach 2001, 291-292). Based 
on the trajectories of the movements under study, I have identified another source for 
segmentation in nondemocracies: authorities. The regime‘s intervention creates a new cell, 
through nesting sympathizers and then splitting into new cells,  that continues to grow into a 
countermovement. If participants play clever and flexible they can gradually isolate this ill-
formed unit and discredit it in the eyes of the public. The Islamic Regime, aware of the 
mobilization ability of the student movement, has intervened in the body of this movement 
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and divided them into rival groups during the last three decades. The oppression over the 
student movement has been so constant and institutionalized, that division has been 
inevitable for the activists.  
 In the following sections, I discuss the other sources for the segmentation process 
with respect to the student movement and women‘s movement in Iran. 
Personal Power: Participants in the student movement operate based on a feeling that they 
are key elements of the movement and are responsible for the movement‘s achievements. 
Kara, a student activist, said that ―we, in the OCU and ISAs, act based on the electoral 
process. Students know that their voices are heard and each student knows himself or herself 
responsible for the outcomes.‖ Kara mentioned that the main reason some universities have 
been separated from the OCU (Allameh) is the lack of free elections in their campuses, 
enforced and monitored by pro-conservative forces dominating there. 
Pre-existing cleavages: In Iran, students are distributed into different universities and 
colleges across the country based on their ranks in a very high competitive entrance 
examination. A student who had grown up in the capital Tehran might end up studying in 
Yazd, in central Iran. Thus, developing friendship ties is the most common way to build 
connections among students in a new environment. Members of a local student group try to 
recruit a new member with different background to add diversity to their group and practice 
tolerance. Kara told me that, for instance, if we consider a student association in University 
of Shiraz; local students (Shirazes) locate a Kurdish girl student and try to recruit her. If 
successful, they would bring three unique elements to merge to their group: female (gender), 
Kurd (ethnicity), and Sunni (religion). There are times when individuals, especially in bigger 
units with different cleavages, conflict, which results in factionalism. Another student 
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activist, Pouya, told me that the majority of student activists in each university form amongst 
out of state students. These students generally live in the dorms and form different student 
groups from sport and art groups to book clubs. 
 Generational gap is another source for factionalism. According to Abed Tavancheh, a 
board member of the OCU, effective student activism is between 3 to 4 years. Therefore, 
each ―generation‖ is faced with new issues and new approaches to challenge them; 
generational gap is something the student movement cannot avoid. He argues that previous 
generations of student activists belonged to revolutionary, leftist, or reformist ideologies, but 
the generation in the post-reform period is independent of ideology. He explains that ―our 
concern is far beyond political freedom; we have focused on social freedoms.‖ 
Ideological differences: As discussed in chapter 2, the student movement divided on 
ideology over and over again. The splits either have internal roots, such as participants of a 
student group are supporters of different oppositional and state‘s political parties, or have 
external roots in the regime‘s intervention. According to Kara, in recent years, there has been 
a limited degree of freedom for the Leftist student activism. He said this was a smart move 
by the regime‘s security forces and intelligence community to destroy Liberal Student 
Organization through a virtual openness across the colleges. This is in addition to the 
regime‘s sponsored OCU (Shiraz trend) to paralyze the OCU (Allameh trend).  
 Pouya told me prior to the Presidency of Khatami there were different political-
ideological trends amongst the student activists that were sources for divisions and conflicts. 
But after the Modern faction of the OCU formed ―we tried to be an umbrella to cover all 






Ahmad Ahmadian, secretary of the pro-democracy student association of the University of 
Tehran, in an interview describes the student movement as ―a pro-change organization with a 
mobile and network structure which is decentralized and is able to build coalition with other 
pro-democracy groups to foster its demands‖ (2010). Pouya explained how the OCU builds 
connections with other (primary educated) factions of society, like political parties, press, 
journalists, and other movements like women‘s movement and labor movement. ―The OCU 
is like the hinges on the door between the university and Regular Society. 
 The OCU has two central committees, one to discuss national issues, and the other 
one to be activated when something urgent happens in the capital Tehran. The OCU has 
different committees for conducting a variety of tasks including publication, advertisement, 
contact with authorities, women‘s issues, and etc. The OCU is a union of the Islamic Student 
Associations (ISA) of public and private universities. A majority of votes belong to public 
universities. Each unit of ISA is autonomous but interlinked with others and the central board 
of the OCU. Members of the OCU (Allameh trend) are elected from the members of ISAs, 
both through electoral process. The OCU has enjoyed charismatic leaderships at some points, 
but never a single leader rules over the whole body of the student movement. According to 
Dana, a scholar who monitors social movements in Iran, Ali Afshari, who had coordinated 
Presidential campaign of Khatami throughout 30 campuses, was one of the charismatic 
student leaders. 
 Those students who graduate but are interested to continue their activism generally 
join Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat (the Alumni of Graduate Students) and try to be a helping 
hand to the OCU members. Although the OCU does not look to Advar for its decisions, they 
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consider their guidelines and try to learn from their mistakes. Advar is a political group and 




As discussed before, the student movement has different components or active-cells (ISAs 
and other student groups). The ISAs, the OCU, and other student groups are not detached. 
They are linked through horizontal relationships and are involved in some sort of 
collaboration and exchanging information.  
Personal ties: Kara mentioned that in the beginning of each academic year, members of the 
Islamic Student Associations and representatives of the OCU contact freshmen personally 
and invite them to the orientation programs. He said this approach, especially for recruiting 
out-of-state students who are new to the host city, has been successful. He said the trust that 
builds between student activists is of a kind that in times of turbulence, they will sacrifice for 
each other even when their own families may not. 
Travelling Evangelists: According to Kara, travel to other campuses and inviting visitors to 
different programs that the OCU and ISAs hold has been very successful in sharing 
information and mobilizing new participants in other colleges. He said on many occasions he 
was an invited as a guest speaker to different campuses and academic centers. He said ―At 
some point of my activities, I used to travel twice a week to different colleges and 
educational centers across Iran.‖ 
Large gatherings: Gatherings provide opportunities for participants in the student movement 
to share information and exchange ideas. Different sorts of gathering are: seminars, 
conferences, workshops, conventions, general meetings, and demonstrations. Student 
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activists have also been faced with the same scenario in colleges. Especially since 2005, the 
regime‘s security forces have raided campuses and seized the assets and properties of the 
OCU and ISAs. The regime does not permit student activists to organize any sort of 
gatherings on campuses. Thus the OCU, under repression, has arranged its gatherings and 
meetings outside colleges.  
 One of the practices that participants in the student movement observe is to promote 
and encourage solidarity through chanting and singing songs. The main song they sing in 
almost every gathering and has become famous as the student solidarity song is Yar-e 
Dabestani-e Man (My Elementary Classmate).  
Communications technologies: They provide participants great means for out reach 
activities: internet, TV, radio, newsletters, newspapers, fax, weblogs, emails, YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter.  
 Communication channels, especially computer mediated and web-based 
communication, have turned into major tools for a sustained mobilization amongst activists 
in Iran. Whenever they cannot pour into streets, they populate the web. Despite the Islamic 
Republic efforts to slow down communications through the net and hostility against dissent 
bloggers, the rate of internet use in Iran is one of the top-ranked among nations. According to 
Internet World Stats website the number of users in Iran rose from 250,000 in 2000 to exceed 
over 33,000,000 in 2010, which is 43.2% of the population.  
 The student movement centered on the OCU (Allameh) has two main official 
website, one, the website of the Amir Kabir University, and the other Daneshjoo News. 
These two websites are under constant filtering of the regime. The other website that helps 
student activists a lot is the official website of Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat. This website is 
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run outside of Iran and therefore is safe from filtering. Student activists also publish 
numerous blogs. One of the main helps that activists inside Iran receive from their 
sympathizers and supporters within the diaspora is the countless number of proxy websites to 
help activists access to their desired websites and information. All activists I interviewed 
agreed that since 2005 the main information channel for contention has become the internet, 
chat rooms and virtual conferences. The growth of web-based activism is so high that one 
official website affiliated to the Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the establishment of a 
Cyber Army to combat activists inside and outside of Iran. 
Extra-movement linkages: The student movement has established different ties with 
political parties, other student groups, other movements (e.g. women‘s movement and labor 
movement), and international movements. But it does not have an established link with the 
authority and its political structure in post-reform period. According to Darvishpour (2008), 
the student movement marked its independence from the state on July 8th, 1999. Dana told 
me that after reformists failed, the student movement gave up hope on reformist parties and 
gradually approached pro-liberal democracy forces outside Iran. Pouya said there are some 
ties between some of the student activists and minority reformists inside the polity, but there 
is not an official tie between the OCU (Allameh trend) and any faction within the authority. 
 Non-governmental clerics and those who believe the mosque and state should be 
separate are another source of support for the student movement. Notable Ayatollahs like 
Zanjani, Sane‘ie, and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri have different offices in many 
major cities. On many occasions, when the regime brutally attacked students and cracked 
down their peaceful gatherings, one or a few of these clerics have issued a statement 
criticizing the regime‘s behavior. 
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 The student movement and the OCU exchange ideas and share information with some 
students‘ groups like Liberal Students of Tehran University, the Student Committee to 
Defend Political Prisoners, Pro-Democracy Student Group of the University of Yazd, and 
Students‘ and the Alumni National Union. The OCU has issued many statements defending 
participants in the labor movement. Especially the OCU has arranged numerous visits with 
the families of labor activists in jail, and tried to be supportive. In addition, in a great move, 
the OCU established its women‘s committee in 2005 and has supported the Change for 
Equality Campaign since its formation. Some of the activists of the student movement are in 
touch with Iranian student activists in exile and with some of the international student 
movements. 
Integrating Factors: A main reason that maintains diverse student groups together in the 
student movement is their common opposition: the Islamic Republic and its constitution.  
 The student movement consists of different student groups with wide range of 
political ideologies, from the conservative Right to the liberal Left. But the Office for 
Consolidation of Unity, especially after the failure of the reform movement not only has 
marked its independence from the political structure, in this case the reformists, but also its 
autonomy from any ideology. Thus the OCU tried to bridge over the ideological gaps and 
cover students with diverse political alignments. 
Figure 5 illustrates different dimensions of the student movement centered on the 
Office for Consolidation of Unity. It demonstrates the social network between the OCU 
(Allameh trend) and the Islamic Student Associations, the relationship between the OCU and 
network of Advar-e Tahkeem-e Vahdat, as well as their network within the social-political 
context of Iran. The OCU and the ISAs build two cliques, one for Tehran and the other the 
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rest of the country. The OCU and the ISAs have established ties with other student groups 
and some of the reformists. They are also connected to the political structure of the state, and 
semi-legal political parties such as the Iran National Front, or the Freedom Movement. The 
figure also demonstrates the social network between the student movement and the global 
North through established ties with the Iranian diaspora and the active Iranian student groups 
in exile. The configuration of the student movement is a hybrid consisting of a few cliques, 



































                                                          














C. The OCU – Central Office; 1. Islamic Student Associations of Universities (more than 150); T. The OCU, Tehran Committee; 2. Islamic Student 
Associations of Tehran Universities (more than 15); A. Advar Central Office; 3. Advar Branches (in major cities, 50); 4. Political Institutions of the 
Regime; 5. Reformists (about 15 parties); 6. Opposition Groups inside Iran; 7. Other Movements (about 9); 8. Other Student Groups; 9. Iranian Student 
Groups; 10. International Student Org.; 11. Opposition Political Parties; 12. UN; 13. Western Political Instt.; 14. Supportive High Rank Clerics (have 

































In Iran, due to its nondemocratic system, political opportunities are rare to access in general 
and almost impossible for dissent activists. The student movement and women‘s movement 
seek opportunities either through a divide in the polity (i.e. Khatami‘s presidency), or 
through semi-democratic debates the regime permits prior to elections in order to earn 
democratic legitimacy.   
 During the Khatami‘s presidency students had allies within the reformist 
administration and the Sixth Majles. For instance, the student movement had many allies in 
the Majles such as Mr. Rep. Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini, Mr. Rep. Ali Tajernia, and Ms. 
Rep. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, all of them previous members of the Office for Consolidation of 
Unity. These representatives started the student fraction of Majles to follow demands of the 
student activists. But what ever they ventured through Majles, the Guardian Council and the 
Supreme leader heavily revised or rejected. Therefore, any reform or change which was not 
approved by the Supreme Leader could not be achieved. Political institutions in the Islamic 
Republic such as Presidency, Parliament, and Judiciary may share a common name with their 
Western institutions but they certainly employ a very different functionality. Even President 
Khatami in his farewell address seemed apologetic to the nation when he said ―in the Islamic 
Republic, the president does not have any authority‖. It seems the next remaining alternative 
is elections.  
 The student movement has been divided over the matter of participation or boycotting 
an election. Even this difference is evident within the central board of the Office for 
Consolidation of Unity. One of the student activists told me that after Khatami‘s presidency 
he did not participate in any election and boycotted the election. Another student activist 
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explained that he evaluates the political structure of a certain election, so that if through 
participation there is no chance to re-shape the political structure in their favor, he boycotts 
the election (like the Presidential election of 2005), but if there is a good chance to re-shape 
the political structure, he promotes participation (like the Presidential election of 2008). In 
both cases, the student movement has a strong ability for mobilization and demobilization 
behind elections. They mobilized masses of students behind Khatami, who claimed a 
landslide victory in 1997 and they demobilized 20 million individuals through boycotting the 
2004 parliamentary election.  
 Student movements also try to create opportunities for contention as they can. Kara 
told me that one of the ways students seize the opportunity to protest is when the OCU 
planned to take freshmen in colleges for a couple of days camping. He said ―we rent a bus 
and take students, boys and girls, together. Most of the time the university administration 
does not let us commute boys and girls together. We see this as an opportunity and start 
protesting and chanting in favor of our demands.‖ 
In the absence of opportunities, in the repressive context of the Islamic Republic, both 










The Student Movement and Adaptive Functionality of the OCU 
As I discussed before, decentralization is a repertoire of necessity for social movement 
organizations in nondemocracies (Schock 2005). In periods of tribulation, strong opposition 
and absence of opportunities, a SPR organization rapidly expands to multiple places and 
different spaces, and adapts to the new environment, which leads to a sustained mobilization 
(Schock 2005, Gerlach 2001, Gerlach and Hine 1981). SPR organizations employ different 
adaptive functions: survivability, proliferation through factionalism, ability-based 
participation, reliability, spreading of contention through competition, learning mechanism, 
and innovation (Gerlach and Hine 1981, Gerlach 2001).  
 Figure 6 illustrates the adaptive functions of a decentralized organization based on the 
communication means it employs for information sharing, its social network, and its 
segmentary structure.  
 The student activists also learned to sustain under oppression. Whenever security 
forces arrest the OCU board members, they immediately get together and elect new board 
members. Through this process they signal the authorities that arrested students are not 
officials of the OCU anymore and thus any enforced confession against the organization 
lacks legitimacy. 
The most innovative move by the student movement and the OCU was to regulate the 
electoral process within the body of the student movement, and enforce their independence 
from the regime and its political structure. Pouya said that despite the parallel OCU (Shiraz 
trend) funded by the regime and all Basij members throughout the campuses, the student 
activism has maintained. One of the ways that students keep their activism alive is when 
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Ahmadinejad or government officials plan to deliver a speech in one of the universities, and 
is often faced with demonstrators and protesters. 
Another innovative means at their disposal are internet based technologies. All of the 
student activists I interviewed told me since there have been no places for their gathering 
across the universities; they have been forced to virtual places. One of the main technologies 
they use is text messaging via their cell phones. One of the activists once told me that prior to 
elections the regime‘s security forces faced a lot of trouble and disapproved from the 







































                                                          
12 Source: Gerlach, Luther P. "The Structure for Social Movements: Environmental Activism and Its 
Opponents." In Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Military, by John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt. Washington DC: RAND Publications, 2001. 
Survive if some segments destroyed by the regime 
Proliferation through factionalism 
The greater the differentiation of groups, the more 
diverse the participants 
Failure of one part does not harm the other parts 
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In Iran the women‘s movement, centered on the One Million Signatures Campaign has 
employed a decentralized structure since the June protests of 2005. 
 
Segmentation 
In an interview with Voice of America, Persian News Network (PNN), Fariba 
Davoodi Mohajer (2010) said that there are varieties of cleavages and backgrounds within 
the women‘s movement, centered on the Campaign for One Million Signatures. Under this 
banner, Iranian women practice democracy and promote tolerance, which has resulted in 
international recognition of the campaign and its achievements. Women activists gather 
around their core belief, equality for women, and put aside what causes conflict and division 
amongst them. 
On the other hand, women activists of the campaign, when faced with members of a 
right wing conservative group, such as Zainab Society, welcomed them to their gatherings 
and let them participate. Ziba said women did not eliminate such groups from their activities, 
they believed that after all, those individuals are also women. The fact that they would sit and 
listen to the talks has been considered a success for the women‘s movement.  
In the following sections, I discuss the other sources for segmentation process with 
respect to the women‘s movement in Iran. 
Personal Power: Participants in the women‘s movement, individuals or groups, operate 
based on a genuine feeling that they are key elements of the movement, who have access to 
all available resources, and are responsible for the movement‘s achievement. ―They don‘t 
wait to be asked‖ (Gerlach 2001, 291). ―Individual initiative, independent action, and 
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personal responsibility‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1981, 43) encourage participants to form new 
action-cells and advocate for their own means to achieve the movement‘s ends. Ziad Munson 
(2002) refer to self-starters, or volunteers as Khorasani (2009) mentions, who consciously 
decided to contact the student movement and women‘s movements, are great sources for 
mobilization.  
―Then there was the formidable diversity displayed by the tens 
of thousands of volunteers [emphasis is mine] who swiftly 
filled our signature-gathering, pamphlet-distributing ranks…. 
Before any of us knew it, we began to feel ourselves changing 
and adapting.‖ 
     (Khorasani 2009, 53) 
Pre-existing cleavages: Khorasani (2009) and Ziba, an activist and campaigner, argue that 
the new generation of women activists are independent from ideologies that dominated 
previous movements. They are neither Islamist leftist, nor reformist. They do not want to get 
trapped in the struggle over mosque and state. Ziba told me that one of the beauties about the 
Change for Equality Campaign is its pluralistic nature. She said women build bridges over 
existing cleavages and look at diversity as a way to strengthen solidarity among activists.  
Ideological differences: Khorasani (2009) has identified five generations of feminism in the 
history of the women‘s movement. The current generation, the fifth one, ―drives its 
legitimacy from the bottom up and from within their daily lives, not from an official 
ideology‖ (p. 50). This is in contrast with Islamic feminism generation that seeks its 
legitimacy in Islamic texts, or the other generations that seek their identity either in another 





The One Million Signatures Campaign has 30 provincial campaigns, mainly in capitals of 
each province, and 8 overseas campaigns: two in the United States, five in Europe, and one 
in the United Arab Emirates. There is no one person that rules through the entire campaign. 
Shirin Ebadi, 2003 Noble Peace Laureate and a supporter of the campaign, once mentioned 
that ―even if we wanted to, we couldn‘t stop the One Million Signatures Campaign‖ 
(Khorasani 2009, 7). This polymorphic movement, which does not enjoy any single 
charismatic leader and reflects ideas and opinions of a large cross-section of women, is best 
described by its founders as ―a polycentric movement composed of a pluralistic fabric‖ 
(Khorasani 2009, 7). Khorasani explains that in the general meeting of the campaign, 
participants debated the need for a tighter and more hierarchical organization, but the 
majority rejected the idea on the ground that ―the degree of centralization proposed would be 
un-feminist‖ (Ibid, 69). 
 Ziba said the Change for Equality Campaign does not have a leader; the main 
inspirational force behind the campaign is feminine dreams. The campaign started with 
group-oriented leadership, and in fact, it has formed to protest tak-sedayee (solo voice). 
 Women activists in the Change for Equality Campaign do not have any leader, or 
board of leaders, rather they have hubs. A hub is a participant with lots of connections 




Khorasani (2009) describes the One Million Signatures Campaign as ―a loose, unofficial 
network‖ (p. 6) that provides new opportunities for women‘s activism in Iran. Its innovative 
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face-to-face approach is unique in the Middle East, and not only did its bloggers populate the 
internet, but also so many activists poured from every corner of the country to support the 
campaign. 
Personal ties: In the case of women‘s activism in Iran, Bahareh Hedayat is a node that 
bridges the student movement and women‘s movement together. She is a student leader of 
the Office for Consolidation of Unity and also a key member of the One Million Signatures 
Campaign. Through personal ties, especially kinship and family ties, every-day new 
individuals voluntarily set up their connection with the campaign network. All these 
participants use their strong ties to add new connections to the unstructured web of the 
Change for Equality Campaign, and when they commute to their outreach, they initiate their 
weak ties and spread the information flow across these bridges. In this way, ―a live and 
dynamic though unfixed network of participants is moving forward ceaselessly‖ (Khorasani 
2009, 7). Ziba believes, when the campaign activists contact women of different 
backgrounds, they practically contact society as whole. And by the same token, the regime 
controls the society through controlling and oppressing women. 
 The Guidelines for Joining the Campaign, from the official web site of the Change for 
Equality Campaign, provides instructions for campaigners on how to collect signatures. It 
teaches through five steps how to start collecting signatures from the immediate family 
members and expand the circle through relatives, friends, private gatherings, weddings, 
neighborhoods, workplaces, and finally various social arenas including: hair salons, sport 
clubs, hospitals, and etc. This simple procedure shows how the women‘s movement expands 
its ties into each and every corner of the society. 
108 
 
Travelling Evangelists: Travel to different regions, urban and rural, is a key function of the 
One Million Signatures Campaign. According to campaigns‘ internal reports, there are about 
400 trained volunteers that travel across the country, recruit new individuals, train them and 
help them to set up their own campaign (Khorasani 2009). These ―Equality‖ evangelists 
target regions that have some common ties in them, such as ethnicity. Through all these 
travels, the women‘s movement could bridge many strong cells, and has built effective 
informational routes. Ziba said, when women, especially in rural areas, became aware of the 
campaign representatives and their programs, they were so welcoming and asked: ―Are you 
here to help us?‖ 
Large gatherings: The women‘s movement organizes a wide variety of gatherings and 
programs to raise awareness for their cause. 
Activists in the One Million Signatures Campaign who did not have access to public 
places for their gatherings and were barred from holding gatherings by the regime‘s security 
forces, turned their living rooms in to ―cultural salons‖ (Khorasani 2009, 45). Women 
campaigners arrange different gathering and conferences but the most common form is 
workshops. The Change for Equality Campaign has three main sets of workshops to raise 
awareness and recruitment: What is the One Million Signatures Campaign?, How to Face  
Family-based Violence?, and An Equal Family. 
  One of the practices that participants in the women‘s movement observe is to 
promote equality awareness and encourage solidarity through singing two songs in almost all 
of their gatherings: ―Oh Woman, You are the Essence of Life‖ and ―Oh Woman, You are My 
Companion‖. The lyrics of these two songs have been published in many feminist sites and 
almost become like a national anthem for women.  
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Communications technologies: Women in the Change for Equality Campaign share their 
information and exchange their ideas through a wide variety of means, from talking face-to-
face, to walking from street to street and knocking door-to-door, to sending email, posting 
YouTube videos, and publishing blogs.  
 Ziba told me one of the main reasons that women activists have populated the internet 
is the fact that there is not any patriarchal shadow monitoring and censoring their feminist 
ideas in virtual spaces, as opposed to traditional publishing. 
 The Change for Equality Campaign has 22 official website and numerous bloggers 
and websites as supporters and sympathizers. Although their websites have been hacked by 
the regime‘s security forces and shut down several times, but they have started to shift their 
web masters outside Iran to prevent constant interruptions by the regime. 
 Maryam Rahmani (2008), one of the activists, used SMS messaging to promote her 
opposition to the Family Protection Law by text messaging members of Majles. At first, they 
responded, but eventually they blocked her number.   
Extra-movement linkages: The women‘s movement has always struggled with making ties 
with political parties and interest groups. Vala, another activist I interviewed, said that even 
prior to the revolution of 1979, women doubted if it was right for them to enter politics. 
Khorasani (2009) argues that ―we need to learn to turn the tables and ‗use those who would 
use us‘ in order to press our own demands for fairer treatment‖ (p. 75). Women activists are 
divided on whether to contact political structure and parties within the polity. But there is 
also this core belief that the campaign should find its way to the patriarchal political 
establishment and ―spread its message of equality and fair treatment among the political 
class‖ (Khorasani 2009, 75). Ziba said the campaign‘s diverse background and their 
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segmentary characteristic has been the key to doing so. She explained, ―we have spread our 
words within political class through our participants who are either sympathizers of, or have 
ties with different factions of the political structure‖.  
 The women‘s movement is a coalition of a variety of women‘s groups such as the 
Campaign against Stoning, the Campaign against Child Execution, and the Campaign for 
Equality in Sport Arenas, to name a few.  
 Some of the activists of the student movement are in touch with Iranian student 
activists in exile and with some of the international student movements. The women‘s 
movement has some strong and weak ties within the Iranian diaspora, especially women in 
academics or activists in one of the Iranian women‘s groups in exile, and through them has 
established numerous weak ties with the women‘s movements in different countries. 
―In considering the relationship of the Iranian women‘s movement to 
similar multinational ones, we are driven to reflect on the great social 
power of immigrants – in this case, the millions-strong diaspora of 
Iranians broad – who are multilingual and multicultural and for a 
prominent presence in the arts, the academy, commerce, the media, 
and the internet, and who exert significant influence on public and 
official opinion in the countries of the wealthy global North.‖ 
      (Khorasani 2009, 77) 
Integrating Factors: A main factor that unites diverse women‘s groups together in the 
movement is a common opposition: the Islamic Republic constitution.  
The One Million Signatures Campaign consists of numerous women‘s group, with 
different priorities at hand, but the top priority for all of them is the concept of ―equality‖ 
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which has been entered in the lexicon of all aspects of their contention (Khorasani 2009). The 
women‘s movement in its current phase is independent from dominant ideologies within 
Iranian society namely leftist, nationalist, and Islamist. They don‘t even call themselves just 
advocates of human rights. 
Ziba told me that the main factor behind women‘s solidarity is ―common feminine 
suffrages‖. 
Figure 7 illustrates different dimensions of the social network of the One Million 
Signatures Campaign. It demonstrates the social network between the campaign in Tehran 
and the provincial centers as well as their network within the social-political context of Iran. 
The campaign, as a whole, has established ties with other movement, such as the student 
movement, or the labor movement, other women‘s groups, and male feminists. It has also ties 
with political structure of the state, political parties and interest groups, and variety of social 
places. It also demonstrates the social network between the campaign in Iran and its overseas 
centers. The One Million Signatures Campaign has nine campuses distributed in three 
continents: two in North America, five in Europe, and two in Asia. All of these centers have 
established ties with the campaign in Iran, while they are connected through horizontal 
relations with each other. In addition, it illustrates the network between the campaign in Iran 
and the global West through its ties within the Iranian diaspora. The configuration of the 





















                                                          














T. The One Million Signatures Campaign in Tehran; 1. Campaign Centers across Iran (more than 30); O. Campaign centers outside of Iran (in three 
continents, and in 9 cities); 2. Political Institutions of the Regime; 3. State Political Parties (more than 20); 4. Opposition Groups inside Iran; 5. Other 
Movements (about 9); 6. Other Women‘s Groups and NGOs (more than 100); 7. Social Arena: hair salons, libraries, parks, bus, hospitals, … 
(multitudinous); 8.  Iranian Women‘s Groups (more than 162 in 40 cities); 9. International Women‘s Organizations; 10. Opposition Political Parties; 11. 

























 During the Khatami presidency, women had allies within the reformist administration 
and the Sixth Majles. For instance, Mousavi Khoeini, a parliamentarian member, was one of 
the supporters of the One Million Signatures Campaign who was arrested on June 12th, 2006. 
In addition to having allies within the reformists, the women‘s movement had the support of 
the Center for Women‘s Participation affiliated to the Office of the President. But whatever 
they ventured through Majles, the Guardian Council and the Supreme leader heavily revised 
or rejected. Even some of the laws that had passed before, during Ahmadinejad‘s first 
administration were reversed or cast out from the legislature process. Ziba said, Mrs. 
Mohtashamipour in Home Ministry, under Khatami, created local centers to promote female 
entrepreneurship; teaching women skills for independence and security. Although the next 
government, under Ahmadinejad, shut down this program, the connections, groups, and skills 
remained intact. 
 The women‘s movement has another approach to elections. The activists do not 
boycott or encourage electoral participation. They do not endorse any of the candidates 
either, but present their request – reform of the discriminatory laws and joining with 
international conventions – to the presidential debates and ask voters to judge for themselves. 
Khorasani (2009) argues that one of the innovative ways that the women‘s movement 
activists seizes political opportunities is when candidates want to take advantage of this 
vehicle: ―[they] support our campaign only out of a desire to curry favor with voters, I say: 
By all means, let them run and win on our platform! If our appeal becomes that strong , it 
will not matter if this or that politician really agrees with us, so long as he knows that the 
voters are with us, and the voters are watching‖ (p. 66). Both movements, in the presence of 
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political opportunities and a favorable political structure, employ the maximum number of 
ties to mobilize not only the public, but also the political class, especially through their weak 
ties or bridging capitals. A favorable political structure appears when authorities divide over 
the oppression or support of a movement. In a network-oriented contention ―because 
individuals participate in the decision making process, they may be more committed and 
enthusiastic in carrying out tasks than when they are simply give orders by superiors‖ 
(Schock 2005, 50).  
 
The Women’s Movement and Adaptive Functionality of the Campaign 
Ziba in an interview told me that campaign activists back and support each other‘s groups. 
She explained the decentralized nature of the campaign does not let security forces of the 
regime attack to all groups, they raid one women‘s group at a time: ―When the crackdown 
occurs, and certain activists get arrested, we react to this event and try to raise our voices to 
different places and put pressure on the authorities for their freedom. Thus when a unit is 
destroyed through the repression the rest is survived as our cells are autonomous while 
interlinked‖.  
Khorasani (2009) and Ziba argue that although the movement expands through many 
numbers of splits, which attract individuals with more common ties to each other, sometimes 
factionalism cause conflict between different women‘s groups. When this happens, mainly 
over different interpretations of the goals or methods to approach an issue, women try to 
handle this ―other‖ and do not eliminate it. This problem unfortunately exists in the other 
movements, especially in the student movement. In other words, women activists ―utilize 
individual differences to build collective strength‖ (Schock 2005, 50). 
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The women‘s movement centered on the Change for Equality Campaign evaluates 
and studies ―the history of their grandmothers‘ struggles‖, learns from their failures and tries 
to avoid their mistakes (Khorasani 2009, 33). They also learn from each other‘s failures, if 
part of the campaign or one of its provincial centers fails, the rest of the campaign‘s body 
tries to avoid the same mistakes (Ziba). The campaign‘s face-to-face approach for collecting 
signatures and raising awareness is its most innovative approach. It is the most non-violent 
means for contention in a nondemocracy like Iran. They raise awareness about the 
discriminatory laws while they are on sidewalks, streets, in parks, libraries, gas stations, 
factories, hair salons, sport clubs, and every corner of the society. An activist even once told 
me they collected signatures in the area of Revolutionary Court before their hearing for their 
activism, and she told me that when under persecution she tried to raise the awareness of her 
persecutors and how these laws could make the lives of their wives better!  Khorasani (2009) 
explains that activists in the campaign ―have gradually learned how to deal with state‘s 
securities‖ (p. 42). Ziba said the regime‘s security forces who were paralyzed in uncertainty 
by women‘s protests and demonstrations, started to crackdown their gatherings brutally. She 
said women evaluated the situation and asked authorities if it would be fine to go and talk to 
people individually and make them aware of their cause, instead of protest. And the regime 
signaled anything but demonstration was all right. Ziba said at that time women started door-
to-door campaigns. This resulted in more arrests. When asked authorities ―why do you arrest 
us? We didn‘t organize any demonstrations!‖ they said they were not aware of the scale and 
distribution of our new approach. 
Another innovative approach is that the One Million Signatures Campaign does not 
have card-carrying membership. According to one of its official websites, 
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www.iranianfeministschool.org, ―the campaign does not have membership because 
campaigners do not want anybody think of her/him self the owner of the campaign and take 
the right to decide or publish on be half of the rest.‖ 
The California branch of the One Million Signatures Campaign started raising 
awareness of the discriminatory laws that affect women even outside Iran. For example; 
according to article 46 of the Family Protection Law, a woman outside Iran who marries a 
non-Iranian citizen without permission of the government she and her family are subject to 
punishment, so they encouraged Iranian in diaspora to sign and send letters to all Iranian 

















SPR and Mobilization 
Ziad Munson (2008) in The Making of Pro-Life Activists identifies four steps for the 
mobilization process: ―contact with the movement at a turning point in one‘s life, initial 
activism, the development of [core] beliefs, and finally sustained activism‖ (p. 47). He argues 
that personal contacts and experiencing a turning point are two main pre-requisites for 
mobilization. Figure 8 illustrates the mobilization process and the social network formation 
of a movement. It shows the intertwined relationship between the evolving reticulation 
structure of a movement and its mobilization process.  
 Personal contact with the movement initiates the first step towards mobilization. The 
main component for this purpose is activists‘ social network (Munson 2008); the strong ties 
and weak ties, friends and acquaintances. Munson defines contact as ―a point at which an 
individual has direct experience‖ (Ibid, 48) with a movement. But not every contact will lead 
to mobilization. To be effective the movement contact has to be personal and the cause of the 
movement has to be discussed explicitly (Munson 2008).  
 Munson‘s findings show the important role of the social networks in movement 
mobilization. Individuals‘ ties are channels through which a person set up her/his contact 
with a movement. The wider the social network is, the higher the ability for mobilization is. 
That is why the activists in the One Million Signatures Campaign describe the campaigns‘ 
face-to-face approach highly practical and innovative. The campaign activists set up a face-
to-face dialogue with individuals from different social arenas of their everyday lives, from 
streets and parks to hair salons and even a courtyard. They express their causes, i.e. equality, 
with their audience under different situations, either laughing with friends at parties, or 
showing resistance under persecution in prisons. 
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14 Sources: Ziad Munson. The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works 2002, p 
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They contact everybody, free from class, ethnicity, ideology, and religion, because their 
subject is equal human beings. Student activists contact freshmen and refresh their contacts 
with sophomores and seniors, invite them to their programs and activities. In comparison 
with the women‘s movement, the student movement has limited its activities to a smaller 
space, colleges, and its audience has been students from lower-middle class and middle class 
families, especially the out-of-state students. In addition to the place and audience, during 
summers when students, especially out-of state students, return their homes, mobilization is a 
more challenging issue for the student movement. 
 Activists in both the student movement and women‘s movement forge their 
mobilization network through a variety set of ties: family, friendship, professional, political, 
diaspora, random, and volunteer. But volunteers or ―self-starters‖ as Munson (2008) 
references, who consciously initiate their contacts have been the main source for a sustained 
activism in both cases.    
Although personal contact is a necessary condition for mobilization, it is not 
sufficient. Its complementary condition for the person is going through a turning point. 
Munson defines turning points as: ―those periods when people are required to make 
significant changes in their everyday lives and, as a result, must also reorient their way of 
looking at and understanding the world‖ (Munson 2008, 55).  
Munson (2008) argues that the personal contact with a movement is effective if it 
happens during an individual‘s critical turning point. My study of the two movements in Iran 
shows that there were many instances that personal contact initiated a seed in an individual‘s 
mind which at a later time reminded that person as she or he reached a turning point. Or 
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perhaps an individual had already gone through a turning point which left an emotional scar, 
and after his/her contact with the movement, initiates activism. 
 The turning point for many of the participants in the Change for Equality Campaign 
was the time they witnessed a violent scene in their neighborhood, heard a friend lost custody 
over her children, or learned a relative or some loved one committed suicide. When these 
individuals become aware through the movement contacts, they initiate their participations. 
At the same time, the theocratic regime of Tehran accuses these volunteer activists as spies of 
the U.S. government, funded by Soros Foundation to conduct a Velvet Revolution in Iran 
(Khorasani 2009). Kara explained that after couple of years of constant contact the student 
activists recruited him. He mentioned that after two years of monitoring the OCU activities, 
and because it was few years until the electoral process had become a reality within the 
OCU, ―I became optimistic that some change could happen through this organization‖. 
Kara‘s story reveals that an individual‘s transition through turning point makes the person 
physically and emotionally available for participation in the movement. 
 Activists in the student movement have initiated their activism, their first 
participation, through attending a rally, protest, or a meeting, whereas, for many of 
participants in the women‘s campaign, it has been the moment they sign a petition. 
 The next step in the mobilization process is developing the core beliefs of a 
movement. Participants, by participating in movement activities, are exposed to new ideas 
and interpretations of the core beliefs of a movement (Munson 2008).  The Change for 
Equality Campaign provided the public with three main publications: a petition, campaign‘s 
means and ends, and a pamphlet (The Effect of Laws on Women Lives). According to 
Khorasani (2009), diverse participants in the campaign have a shared understanding of and 
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hold a common ground with respect to the core beliefs of the movement. She argues that the 
purpose behind these publications is to create a ―thought-action continuum‖ (p. 6). 
Workshops are another way that women were exposed to the core ideas behind the 
campaigns. Students, by participating in the OCU activities, especially conferences and trips, 
are exposed to the core beliefs behind this organization.  
The last phase of mobilization is a sustained participation. Participants through 
different ways remain involved in the movement: protests, rallies, demonstrations, meetings, 
workshops, training, and means of information flow (Munson 2008). Khorasani argues that 
the success of the campaign ―depends heavily on the continued commitment and enthusiasm 
of the campaign‘s independent-minded younger members. Sustaining that commitment is 




































                                                          
15 Sources: Ziad Munson. The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works 2002, p 
48. Table 3.1. Luther Gerlach. The Structure for Social Movements: Environmental Activismand Its Opponents 
2001. 
 
Face-to-face contact with freshmen at the 
beginning of each academic year 
Turning point for many students like Kara is the               
     democratic process of the OCU                                                                   
                                                
Initial Activism for many of the students happens 
when attending the orientation of the ISAs, or a 
popular figure delivers a talk in support of the 
OCU 
Development of the core beliefs for many of 
students happen through roundtables or 
seminars either inside or outside of campuses 
targeting different policies of the state 
 
Full Movement Participation: when students join 
the local ISAs and participate in most of its 
activities, many find their ways to the OCU and 
become nodes travelling and spreading the 
words of the movement. 
Reticulation: 
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16 Sources: Ziad Munson. The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works 2002, p 
48. Table 3.1. Luther Gerlach. The Structure for Social Movements: Environmental Activismand Its Opponents 
2001. 
 
Face-to-face contact with people in the streets, 
parks, sport clubs, beauty salons, libraries, buses, 
and other social places. 
Turning point for many was the time they           
witnessed a violent scene in their neighborhood, 
heard a friend lost custody over her children, or           
    learned a love one committed suicide.                                           
Initial Activism for many of participants in the 
women’s campaigns has been the moment they 
signed the petition. 
Development of the core beliefs is through the 
campaign’s three core publications: the petition, 
campaign’s means and ends, and ‘the Effect of 
Laws on Women’s Lives’ pamphlet 
 
Full Movement Participation: When women, 
especially the younger ones voluntary commit 
themselves to the goals of the campaign and 
try multiple ways on their own to foster the 
change, like Maryam who raised awareness 
through her blog, mobilized by gathering 
signatures, and contacted the parliamentarians 
through SMS 
Reticulation: 
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Comparison of the student movement, centered on the Office for Consolidation of Unity (the 
OCU), and the women‘s movement centered on the One Million Signatures Campaign (the 
OMSC) reveals the different mobilization abilities associated with the reticulation structure 
fashioned by each social movement organization. Table 8 compares the student movement 
and the women‘s movement based on this study. 
Table 8 – Comparison between the Student Movement and the Women‘s Movement 
Student Movement Women’s Movement 
Marked its autonomy after July 1999 Marked it autonomy after June 2006 
Had strong allies within the polity from 1997 to 
2005 
Had strong allies within the polity from 1997 to 
2005 
Has changed its role from an alternative for 
political parties under reformists to defender of 
the human rights under conservatives 
Has a focused and targeted goal: social and legal 
equality for men and women 
Dominated in colleges and educational centers Active in every corner of society 
Their activities are political They do not claim their activities as political, 
rather social and cultural 
Less support within the society when their goal 
was political, more support they receive as 
human rights defenders 
Have lots of supports within the society 
Look at democratization as top – down process 
and through elites, less attention to the public 
Look at democratization as bottom – up process 
and within the grassroots, but has elites in its 
rank 
Has financial problem, income is solely based on 
contributions from activists and family members 
Has financial problem, income is solely based on 
contributions from activists, family members, 
and generous members of diaspora 
Has contact with international organizations Has contact with international organizations 
Has no contact with the transnational student 
movement 
Has problem with colleagues in transnational 
movement as they focus on high profile issues 
like stoning, rather than local issues 
 
The trajectories of the student movement within the last three decades demonstrate its 
evolutionary transition ―from a movement against rights to a movement for rights‖ 
(Yaghmaian 2002, v). The Office for Consolidation of Unity, once the arm of the regime 
within the campuses and operator of its ―cultural revolution‖, has turned into a human rights 
watch organization. It has gone through different phases of factionalism. Through the 
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divisions, the OCU has gradually recognized the inefficiencies of the political structure in 
Iran, especially after the failure of the reform government, and marked its liberation since the 
July events of 1999.  
The trajectories of the women‘s movement within the last three decades demonstrate 
its transition through five generations of feminism. A movement once was seeking its 
identity within other social-political context, and later within the religious texts, has turned 
into a movement that seeks its legitimacy from the daily common activities. The fifth 
generation of feminism has liberated itself from all sorts of ideologies since June 12th, 2006. 
Mashayekhi said the student movement has defined different goals based within the 
last decade. The OCU, from an organization that wanted to play the role of a political party 
under Khatami‘s administration, has turned into a human rights advocator under 
Ahmadinejad‘s. The women‘s movement, on the other hand, has been more target-oriented 
and has focused on one issue, i.e. equality. He mentioned that the OCU should be more 
specific on its demands, but on the other hand it has been customary amongst the public to 
expect the student movement to act as political as it can. He criticized the OCU as it does not 
pay enough attention to the problems students face on campuses like the quality of foods, or 
the condition of dorms. He emphasized if the OCU had paid attention more to these types of 
issue, it could mobilize the entire student body behind its political ambitions. Mashayekhi 
evaluated the One Million Signatures Campaign with higher level of segmentation and task 
allocations among its various units. 
Elitism is another key difference between the OCU and the Change for Equality 
Campaign. The student activists have approached the reform issue through political elites and 
intellectuals, and has left the public behind. Women started their campaign to mobilize the 
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grassroots and have social elites such as Nobel Prize laureate, Shirin Ebadi, in their rank. 
Students look at the democratization as a top down process, whereas women activists 
consider it a bottom up issue. ―Without seeping into the fabric of daily life, philosophical 
discourse cannot – and for years has not been able to – have a practical influence on the real 
life circumstances with which Iranian people must deal‖ (Khorasani 2009, 46). These two 
different approaches may have roots in their organizational structure. The OCU, with its 
more formal structure, has been more suited to ―institutionalized pressure tactics‖ and the 
One Million Signatures Campaign, with its more informal structure, has been ―more 
appropriate for service projects and consciousness raising‖ (Staggenborg 1989, 76).  
Both student activists and women campaigners have faced continued financial 
problems. They are barred from organizing even fundraiser programs to cover their costs. 
They generally spend from their own pockets, or their families support them. But both have 
benefited from financial support from generous Iranian individuals inside Iran and within the 
diaspora from time to time. To avoid being labeled spies of the foreign countries they have 
even rejected the monetary part of the international awards rewarded to them.  
The student activists and the women campaigners, in cooperation with their 
colleagues and supporters in diaspora, have invested in educating social activists in Iran. The 
One Million Signatures Campaign by the help of Women Learning Partnership and some 
other international women‘s groups promote leadership skills among women for their daily 
life routines. The student leaders in exile have establishes different centers, like Tavaana, to 
empower and raise social awareness in Iran.     
The student movement and the women‘s movement both have spread their 
reticulation structures through the spaces and places they are active. The women activists 
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have used every free space they could locate in the society. They forged numerous strong ties 
within the society through friendship, marriage, families, and confidentiality, and spread 
countless weak ties across Iran and throughout the global North. In comparison the student 
movement has covered smaller space, has less strong ties and less weak ties within the 
society. The Change for Equality campaign has tried to employ its maximum bonding capital 
and bridging capital and therefore ―is wide and flexible enough to permit all sorts of 
creativity and volunteer activity‖ (Khorasani 2009, 68), which, according to Schock (2005), 
facilitates mobilization.  
According to Pouya, the civil society under Khatami‘s administration grew 
superficially, but during Ahmadinejad‘s presidency the civil society has grown deeper and 
rooted in the social structure. He said the OCU marked its autonomy after 2001 and under 
Khatami, but many believed that the OCU was mainly dependent on reformists. The survival 
of the OCU and its sustained mobilization under Ahmadinejad‘s administration and the 
brutality of the regime is the best evident, according to Pouya this proves the autonomy of 
the OCU. The women during Ahmadinejad employed an organizational diffusion tactic and 
an abeyance approach to mobilization. Like their counterparts in Australia, under Howard‘s 
administration, through diffusion of feminism in male dominated structures, Iranian women 
activists have sustained their commitments and mobilization through hard times. After all, 
they believe, like many women around the globe, that protest and violence is un-feministic 
(Andrew and Maddison 2010). According to Tohidi, women ―have also reclaimed a number 
of national and religious rituals and festivals, giving them new feminist interpretations‖ 
(Afary 2009, 373). 
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Based on the organizational structure and the social network of each of the 
movements under study, exogenous effects like instability in the Middle East aside, I have 
identified that the women‘s movement is more decentralized and more segmented with its 
abeyance structure, and therefore has a better ability to sustain mobilization. Despite what Jo 
Freeman suggested, the loose decentralized structure of the women‘s movement not only 
works for raising awareness, but also is able to get thing done. It does not miss any 
opportunity for establishing a bridge with any social, political, and cultural structure that 
might advance its cause; it is not political in nature, therefore it enjoys a wider set of 
supporters; and it is scattered throughout the country both urban and rural areas.  On the 
other hand, the student movement has a more centralized structure in a limited environment 
(campuses), and mostly in contact with a specific faction of the society (students), but when 
opportunities are available, or conditions to create opportunities exist, the student movement 
responds faster.  
The hypotheses are based on the data I could find from interviews and some 
secondary sources. Although statistical data is rarely accessible at this point, my hope is that 
these hypotheses will provide a starting point and an open door for future research on non-











Most studies that have examined the relationship between decentralized social movement 
organizations and movement behaviors have focused their attention on certain aspects of this 
relationship, such as its general effectiveness and adaptive functionality for a changing 
environment; its innovative role on nonviolent repertoire of contention in nondemocracies; 
its degree of effectiveness; the role of personal relationships on a movement‘s formation; the 
role of preexisting and emerging ties on recruitment processes; and the impact of internet 
technologies on building collective identity. In contrast this study has initially considered 
focusing on the relationship between the nature of a movement‘s reticulation structure and 
the movement‘s behavior, then has explored the specific connection between varied 
reticulation configurations and specific behaviors they are associated with based on a detailed 
comparison between two social movements. 
 Another distinguishing factor is the political context of the social movements I have 
studied. In contrast to prior research, which was either conducted on democratic systems, or 
if a nondemocracy the focus has been the repertoire of contention, this study has conducted 
on a theocratic regime; a nondemocratic, religion-based system. 
 The main question underlying this study was, how does reticulation affect a 
movement‘s ability to mobilize and respond to opportunities and to sustain mobilization in 
the absence of opportunities? This study has examined different variations of the student 
movement and the women‘s movement behaviors in the political context of the Islamic 
Republic based on their reticulation configurations between 1997 and 2008. Because the 
absence and presence of political opportunities varied this study is time-specific. The time 
period of the study provides times when political opportunities have been available (1997–
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2005) or there have been no political opportunities (2005–2008). Political opportunities can 
be measured by having allies or representatives within the government, during elections, or 
by failure of the reform process. The other explanatory variable that could be tested at both 
periods was organizational structure, which has been measured by segmentation, 
polycentrism, and reticulation. Structural and opportunity variables reflect different 
variations of a movement‘s behaviors, which in turn can be measured based on sustainability, 
responses to opportunity or creation of new opportunities.  
 Although the president and the Majles were allies of the movements from 1997-2005, 
because of the nondemocratic structure of the regime, no lasting reforms were really 
achieved. In contrast, periods of election provided the student movement opportunity to 
either boycott the election or mobilize the public behind candidates. In the women‘s 
movement, periods of election provided greater opportunities for networking, raising 
awareness, and gathering signatures for the One Million Signatures Campaign. 
 One of the findings of this study was the effect of different structural configurations 
on a movement‘s behavior. It also reveals that movements employ a hybrid mix of structure. 
Based on this study, the student movement employed a hybrid of cliques and polysepalous 
structures, which gives it the ability to respond more quickly to opportunities as they arise. In 
contrast, the women‘s movement employed a hybrid structure composed of segmented, 
decentralized and reticulated structure, which means the movement can employ an abeyance 
structure to sustain its activity longer under repression. 
 Jo Freeman‘s study of the women‘s movement indicates that decentralized or 
structurelessness is good for raising awareness, but relatively ineffective for fostering real 
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change. However, the relative short history of the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran 
shows that they have moved beyond simply raising awareness. 
 Many studies have covered communication networks a measure of exchanging 
information, but they have not covered technology, especially, web-based networks 
mobilization vehicles through which not only information can be exchanged, but ideals can 
be shared, opinions expressed, new relationships fostered through bonds and bridges. This 
constant emerging of networks blurs the former cleavages and strengthens solidarity in the 
movement.  
 As empirical evidence becomes more available out of Iran, hopefully statistical 
research will open further opportunities for future studies. Although this statistical data is not 
currently widely available, the purpose of this study has been to add our understanding of 
how behaviors of a movement change; under what conditions they change, and based on 
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Protocol for Structured Interviews with Members of/Experts on  
The Student/Women‘s Movement in Iran 
 
Qualification 
1- Are/have you (been) an active member of/expert on either/both of the organizations 
below? 
 
 Student Movement Organization (Office for the Consolidation of Unity) 
 Women‘s Movement Organization (One Million Signature Campaign) 
 If you are not directly involved with either of the organizations, what 
qualifications or connections do you have to the field? What is the basis of your 
knowledge about these organizations? How do you know about them? 
 Are/were you active in any similar organization before or after the revolution of 
1979 in Iran? If yes, please walk me through your experience as you answer the 
following questions. (This provides good information especially for the parts 
lacking resources) 
  
Knowledge about Organization 
2- Do you consider this organization to be part of the student/women‘s movement? 
3- What are the main aims of this organization? 




5- What is/was your position in this organization? 
6- When was the first time you got involved in this organization? How? Why? What 
were the campaign‘s achievements? 
7- What was the first campaign you got involved with? What were the campaign‘s 
achievements? 
8- What was the most important campaign of this organization? Why?  
                                                          
17 Sources: Gerlach, Luther P, and Virginia H Hine. People, Power, Change: Movements of Social 
Transformation. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1981. Swarts, Heidi J. Organizing Urban 




Internal Structure and Decision Process 
9- How would you describe this organization? 
10- How would you describe its leadership? 
11- Does this organization have any central leadership? What is the election process for 
the leadership? 
12- Do you know the mechanism this organization use to choose an issue for a campaign? 
What is its decision making process? 
13- Who decides campaign strategies for this organization? How? 
14- What are the targets of this organization‘s campaigns? 
 
Identity, Membership, and Background 
15- How do you identify with this organization? What is the collective identity of the 
organization? 
16- What are the conditions for membership in this organization? 
17- What kind of Membership does the organization have? 
18- Who does participate in the organization‘s activities? (rallies, protests, etc) 
19- What is the compositional background of this organization? (race, class, religion, 
ideology, gender, political factions) 
 
Self Involvement, Future of Organization 
20- What are you doing in respect to the organization‘s aims and goals? 
21- Are you currently active in any other organization with the same goal? 
22- How do you see the future of this organization? 
23- What are the main problems this organization is facing? 
24- What are the strengths and weaknesses of this organization? 
 
Reticulation - Personal Ties 
25- Who would members turn to for advice on organizational matters, i.e. campaigning 
strategy, issue selection, etc. 
26- Is there any kind of pre-existing ties such as kinship, friendship, or any other type of 
relationship between members of this organization? 
27- How does involvement in this organization affect relationship ties among members of 
the movement? 
28- Do members of this organization attend or are they members of another organization 
of the same kind? 
29- Do members of this organization ever split? 
30- What do you call the new group? Why did they split? A difference in ideology, aims, 




Reticulation - Leadership Ties 
31- Is there any kind of pre-existing relationship between leaders of this organization? 
32- How do you define relationship between leaders of local groups of this organization? 
33- How often do the leaders of your organization meet with each other? 
34- Does this organization have any official sponsor for its activities? 
 
Reticulation - Activities 
35- Do members of this organization have any travel activity to advocate their cause? 
Building connections? Travelling Evangelists?  
(The evangelist is a person who travels purposefully to spread the word, to be a 
speaker at meetings, rallies and etc.) 
36- Does this organization hold any workshop, seminar, or any kind of gathering? 
37- What is the purpose of these gatherings? (exchanging experience; unifying; 
promoting activism; or intensifying commitment) 
38- What are the kinds of events that enhance linkages between cells of this movement? 
39- What are the ways of promoting movement‘s reticulation? (for example: 
switchboards) 
 
Reticulation - Extra Linkages 
40- What are the extra-organizational linkages that this organization uses to achieve its 
goals? (Please walk me through each case)  
 
 Representative of governmental agencies 
 Civic & religious institutions 
 Private foundations and businesses 
 Mosques 
 
41- What is the interaction of this organization with political parties? 
42- What is the relation of this organization with other student/women‘s movements? 
43- How do you see this organization in a transnational framework? 
44- What does the communication of this organization look like and what are its means? 
 
a. Among groups? 
b. Organizations to coordinate actions? 
c. To a general public? 
d. To explain and gain support? 
e. To the opposition? 
f. To promote change? 
 
45- What are the main communicational technologies of this organization? (Print, 





46- What is you definition of a political opportunity? (To advance the cause of the 
movement) 
47- How do you evaluate the openness of political opportunities under Khatami‘s 
administration? 
48- How do you evaluate the openness of political opportunities under Ahmadinejad‘s 
administration? 
49- How do you evaluate the mobilization ability of this organization under each of these 
administrations? (Escape suppression, develop, and accomplish the goals) 
 
